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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.

On 28 February 2008, the Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM), under the mediation of the Kenya National Dialogue and
Reconciliation (KNDR), signed an agreement to end the political violence that followed the
disputed December 2007 elections. Through mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of
Eminent African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan, the parties agreed
to form a coalition government and thereafter undertake far-reaching reforms to secure
sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for
human rights.

2.

South Consulting has been monitoring the implementation of the KNDR agreements from
2008. This report focuses on two issues that have risen in prominence and drawn attention
since the last quarter of 2010: the International Criminal Court investigation of the Kenya
situation, and the implementation of the New Constitution. Previous reports can be found at
www.dialoguekenya.org.

3.

The report has utilized both quantitative and qualitative data. A baseline survey of 9,200
respondents was carried out in the 47 counties in December 2010 and a follow-up survey of
2000 respondents was conducted in March 2011 in the same counties. Qualitative interviews
were conducted in all parts of the country with key informants drawn from government
ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations, the media and the
general public. Secondary sources have also been reviewed for additional information.

FINDINGS
4.
The socio-political and security situation in Kenya has improved considerably, compared to
what it was in 2008 and 2009. There is peace and calm in the country. Public perception of
personal safety has increased, with as large a proportion of the population as 72 per cent
saying they feel safer now than they did in 2008. Life is also much better for many people.
However, people in northern Kenya feel less safe than those in the rest of the country. It is
possible that endemic conflicts over resources and food insecurity are responsible for these
feelings of insecurity.
5.

6.

Political violence ended with the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation
Agreement. However, sustaining the peace and calm that was secured depends on only one
major factor: how political leaders reconcile their differences as the country moves towards
the next General Election, and specifically how they organise their politics for presidential
contests. National level political dynamics will influence local level issues; conflicts will
trickle to the local level and disrupt inter-ethnic relations. There is thus need to manage
national level political divisions to prevent a recurrence of violence.

The ICC and Post-election Violence
Findings show that divisions within the Grand Coalition Government have created an
opportunity for impunity to re-organise and undermine progressive reforms and
interventions aimed at ending impunity. In this review period, the fight against impunity has
been personalised, politicised and ethnicised. This has polarised the fight against impunity
and the need to find justice for victims. The polarisation has specifically obscured the
objectives of the fight against injustice and created an amnesia around the question of justice
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for victims such as IDPs. Further, new political alliances are emerging not based on the need
to deepen reforms that would prevent recurrence of another violent conflict but rather on
the need to use ethnic platforms to promote and protect the political careers of particular
individuals considered to be regional leaders. A tone for divisive ethno-political mobilisation
reminiscent of the eve of 2007 general election is very much evident. This tone has
jettisoned the debate on real reforms that the country should urgently pursue before the next
general elections. The debate for reforms is being abandoned rapidly and replaced with a
debate on succession politics.
7.

Many Kenyans are supportive of the ICC process and are happy that the ICC has finally
embarked on the process to hold accountable those suspected to be most responsible. Over
70 per cent of respondents in a national survey confident that the ICC will prosecute those
suspected of perpetrating violence. These hopes sprout in place of widespread public
disillusionment with the failure to complete investigations required to prosecute cases
arising out of the post-election violence and the failure to establish a local Special Tribunal
to investigate and prosecute high-level perpetrators. Nonetheless, 81% of Kenyans want
other perpetrators of violence tried. They do not want them forgiven. In fact only 7% want
them forgiven. This high number of Kenyans, 81%, who want perpetrators of violence tried
is a pointer that many Kenyans want to address the past. They would want to see a Kenya
free of impunity and injustice; they do not want people to be forgiven.

8.

The ICC Prosecutor’s naming of six suspects in relation to the post-election violence, has
evolved new political dynamics. In addition to consolidation of new political alliances, this
triggered high-level demands for Kenya to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the convention
that established the ICC. Later, there were demands for deferral with Kenya seeking support
from the African Union and the United Nations Security Council to support this course to
defer the cases at ICC. This quest to defer the cases contrasts sharply with high public
demand for prosecution of all perpetrators and high confidence in the ICC intervention.
There is, thus, a disconnect between the political elite and ordinary citizens in terms of how
to deal with post-election violence cases.

9.

Generally, the public is not in sync with the political elite, who appear to have a common
interest in opposing accountability and other measures to end impunity. The behaviour of
politicians demonstrates a business-as-usual political culture and preference for status quo.
On the other hand, there is a strong public mood against impunity.

10.

The naming of suspects has evolved discourses in which some communities claim to be
under siege. There are new discourses of victimisation and isolation among some political
elites. They are also mobilising their ethnic constituencies along these discourses. This has
created a new impetus for ethno-political alignments. Politicians allied to the six suspects
named by the ICC Prosecutor have since begun consolidating or forming new ethn0-political
alliances in preparation for the 2012 elections. The politicisation of ICC indictments has
obscured the need for dialogue on reforms that would prevent future violence and how to
hold perpetrators accountable. Generally, there is limited amount of debate on reforms and
how to move forward in line with reforms agreed upon during the signing of the Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreements (popularly referred to as the National
Accord).

Resettlement of IDPs
11.
Measures to resolve the humanitarian crisis remain tenuous as Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) remain in camps, urban informal settlements and other settings. Landlessness,
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corruption and lack of social cohesion remain the main challenges to finding lasting
solutions to IDPs. Some local communities have resisted the resettlement of IDPs on land
they perceive as belonging to them only.
12.

Although the government and humanitarian agencies provided funds for start-ups,
reconstruction of homes and even the purchase of land to resettle some IDPs, the crisis of
displacement is yet to be conclusively resolved. The issue has become a source of political
capital for national level political leaders as well as for leaders in areas where IDPs were
displaced from, and among ethnic communities whose members are IDPs. As argued in the
previous reports, IDPs’ problems tended to receive very little attention. Its one problem that
lacks leadership in terms of how it should be resolved. Its only mentioned when politicians
wish to generate political capital out of it. Three years after the signing of the National
Accord is a long time to have IDPs unsettled and/or in camps. This problem of IDPs thus
remains a pointer to extent of reconciliation and extent of commitment to reforms in
general.

13.

Inter-communal relations in areas where IDPs live have improved. Many reported that
people relate well. 30 per cent of Kenyans say a lot of reconciliation has taken place among
Kenyans. Another 53 per cent say just a little reconciliation has taken place. These responses
imply that reconciliation is gradually occurring, but it has not been sufficient to ensure the
safe return of IDPs in a sustainable manner. This suggests a need for more elaborate
approaches to social reconciliation.

14.

Cohesion in Government
The Coalition Government continues to face cohesion challenges. Suspicions and lack of
trust continue to characterise relations between the two parties in the Grand Coalition
Government. Although initial differences were between the two parties, parochial and
narrow short-term interests have gradually factionalised them thereby increasing
incoherence within government.

15.

The state of flux in the factionalised parties is likely to increase as the 2012 General Election
approaches. Again this has the potential to threaten implementation of key reforms,
including implementation of the New Constitution. Fault lines within the Cabinet continue
to recur and the image of a divided government —especially that of ‘two-governments-inone’ - has not been effectively addressed because these differences continue to be reflected in
key decisions. There are generally no drivers of coherence in government. New dynamics
such as the politics of ICC and succession politics appear to suggest that these divisions will
continue to hold until the next general elections. In fact as many as 58 per cent Kenyans feel
the Coalition has a hard time working together to implement the new Constitution.
However, Kenyans generally would like the Coalition Government to remain in office until
the next general election

16.

But Kenyans are not dismissive of the Coalition Government. They are happy with the
Coalition because it secured peace and has gone on to deliver a New Constitution. They are
happy that the situation has normalised but have worried about the infighting. They also
want the Coalition to remain until the next general election. But power sharing is not
something many people would like to see in the future, with 75 per cent of Kenyans saying
they would not recommend power sharing between political parties in government after
another election. However, they are unhappy with the Coalition Government because it has
failed to, among other things, fight corruption, promote unity within the government, and
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tackle tribalism. They also think that power sharing between PNU and ODM is still relevant.
Implementation of the New Constitution
17.
The New Constitution has revived optimism for an improved governance culture and hopes
for the well being for the people of Kenya. The Constitution introduced a wide range of
changes in government, the legislature, judiciary and all sectors of society. Up to 54 per cent
of respondents believe their lives will be better. Many want the government to use the New
Constitution to provide security, jobs, and tackle corruption. In this regard, there is need to
adhere to the implementation schedule and avail needed financial resources.
18.

But there are challenges to implementation. There is no public debate or dialogue on major
policy issues. There is absence of civic education and not many people are involved in
discussing its implementation. Citizens also cite political interests, corruption and lack of
cohesion in Government as the main threats to implementation. They note that vested
interests, especially in Parliament, will continue to threaten the passing of laws. It is notable
that because of vested interests, establishing critical bodies such as the Constitution
Implementation Commission (CIC) and the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) was
delayed for about a month. It is also notable that several bills have been drafted and are
awaiting final debate before enactment. Speed is of essence at this stage. Any delay in
enactment of the fundamental laws will slow the high speed required in implementation of
critical reforms before the next general election.

19.

The New Constitution is an omnibus carrying the hope of resolving issues that, if not
completely resolved, would potentially lead to another conflict. It carries a collection of
issues lumped together under the mediation’s Agenda 4, which included, among others
institutional and legal reforms, land reforms, poverty, inequity and regional imbalances,
youth unemployment, ethnicity or national cohesion and unity, as well as entrenching
accountability and ending impunity. Hiccups in implementing the New Constitution sound a
death knell for these long-term issues, signalled as the underlying causes of the post-2007
election crisis and which must be resolved for the future stability of Kenya.

20.

The challenges to implementation place the country on a perilous path as it hurtles towards
another election without establishing and securing critical institutions necessary to manage
political transitions. These include the new electoral management body, resolution of the
delineation of boundaries, and the establishment of a fully functioning judiciary as envisaged
in the New Constitution.

21.

How these institutions are established will determine the level of confidence and trust that
people will have in them. They must be established in a manner that is transparent and
credible, and most importantly, in line with the values and principles of the New
Constitution of Kenya. Appointing people on basis of party and/or ethnic consideration will
undermine the credibility of these institutions. On the whole, people’s involvement in
oversight of the process is crucial to sustain momentum for implementation of the
constitution, and delivery on the balance of Agenda 4 reforms.

22.

Conclusion
The New Constitution has revived optimism for a different, more responsive governance
culture. The Constitution carries the hope of resolving all issues identified under Agenda
Item 4 and in particular the underlying factors that contributed to the post-2007 election

viii

violence. But there are fresh challenges to the implementation of the New Constitution.
Vested interests and an old political culture, as well as short-term and narrow interests, are
threatening the full implementation of the constitution. If not effectively managed, short
term focus and interests, combined with the lack of cohesion within Government, and lack of
leadership to manage political divisions, could fail the country again.
23.

The framework for reforms is very much in place. Several institutions have already been
established and relevant legislation formulated. However, speed is required to pass the
remaining bills to build a strong foundation for implementation of the constitution.

24.

The majority of voters supported the New Constitution. They gave it legitimacy by approving
it in large numbers. They aspired to see a new Kenya and a fresh start. They voted for new
values and principles of governance. They elected to have ethical leadership and responsible
leaders. Failing to live by the spirit and the values embraced by the new constitution will
disillusion the public, with adverse consequences. There is a need for strong vigilance by
everyone on the implementation process because this an important opportunity to build a
new society.

25.

Civic education on the New Constitution is required as a matter of urgency to build both
demands by citizens and awaken the government to what its institutions are required to
supply. The demand for civic education is huge and therefore will require joint provision by
the government, the CIC, civil society and other actors. The Cabinet has supported provision
of civic education in this regard. Institutions, materials and strategies for delivery should be
rolled out fast to deepen the momentum to pursue the principles and values of the New
Constitution.

26.

Although the ICC process has introduced certain challenges, it presents an important
opportunity for reforms. The process is laying the groundwork for fighting impunity and
ensuring that people account for their actions. Although some political leaders are unified in
their efforts to oppose the ICC process, the ordinary people are not with them. They perceive
the ICC process as the last resort in fighting impunity and getting justice for victims.

27.

Kenyans want a local judicial process to try middle and lower level perpetrators. They want
justice for victims and they want people to account for their actions. There is a need then to
begin establishing a framework to try other perpetrators because the ICC will not deal with
everyone identified as a perpetrator.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a periodic report on the progress of implementing reforms under the Kenya National
Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement of 2008, signed between the
Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
following the dispute over the December 2007 presidential election result and the
subsequent violence. Through mediation by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent
African Personalities led by Mr Kofi Annan, the parties committed to achieve the KNDR goal
of ‘sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for
human rights’.
2. The two parties agreed to tackle four main issues expressed as Agenda items 1-4: These
were2:
a. Agenda Item 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights
and liberties;
b. Agenda Item 2: Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis and
promote healing and reconciliation;
c. Agenda Item 3: How to overcome the political crisis; and
d. Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues, including constitutional and
institutional reforms, land reforms, poverty and inequalities, youth
unemployment, national cohesion, and transparency and accountability.
3. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the KNDR agreements from 2008.
Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. This report covers the last quarter of
2010.
4. This report is the first report to track reforms after the promulgation of the New
Constitution of Kenya in August 2010. It covers the period between November 2010 and
March 2011. The report has utilised both quantitative and qualitative data. In December
2010, quantitative data was collected through a national survey comprising 9,200
respondents drawn from across all the 47 counties established under the New Constitution.
A smaller survey of 2000 respondents was conducted in March 2011 in the same number of
counties. This presentation focuses, therefore, on the county as well as the national level.
5. Qualitative data was obtained through interviews with key informants drawn from
Government ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations, the media
and the general public. Secondary information was obtained by reviewing reports and
documents by the Government, development agencies, the media and non-governmental
bodies.
6. The review is based on data and recognises too well that political interests and realities are
sensitive to analyses of implementation of reforms. In writing the report, therefore, we have
taken care to remain objective and let the data to speak.
7. The report is organised into four main parts corresponding to the respective agenda items.
1.

The Annotated Agenda and Timetable for KNDR signed on 1 February 2008 viewed Agendas 1, 2 and 3 as ‘short term’
actionable problems to be addressed within a period of 7-15 days from the date of commencement of the dialogue, and Agenda
4 as a long term programme to be resolved within a period of one year.

However, the main emphasis in all the parts is the issue of implications of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) investigation of the Kenya situation; and implementation of the New
Constitution. The report also contains two annexes. Annex 1 – National Baseline Survey
conducted in December 2010; and Annex 2 – National Baseline Survey (select findings) by
county. The report is organised as follows:
e. Part II: The ICC and the Post-election Violence
f.

Part III: The ICC and Implication for IDPs

g. Part IV: The ICC and Implications for Political Cohesion
h. Part V: Challenges to the New Constitution
i.

2

Part VI: Conclusion

2.

THE ICC AND POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE

Introduction
8. The KNDR agreement outlined measures the Government, the police, the media and the
public needed to undertake to halt the violence, guarantee security for all Kenyans and
restore fundamental rights and liberties. A Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election
Violence (CIPEV or the Waki Commission3) was established. It recommended the setting up
of a Special Tribunal for Kenya to investigate and try those responsible for the most serious
criminal acts during the crisis period.
9. The Waki Commission also recommended handing over suspects to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) if the government failed to set up the Special Tribunal. After several
unsuccessful attempts to set up this mechanism within the specified timeframes, the matter
was handed over to the ICC in July 2009. On 15 December 2010, the ICC Chief Prosecutor
announced that he was seeking summons for six persons suspected to bear the greatest
responsibility for crimes committed during the post-election violence (PEV). The
summonses were issued for the suspects to appear before the ICC on 7-8 April 2011.
10. This section of the report looks at the effect of ICC investigation on the Kenya situation thus
far. The report also examines its implications for peace and security. The problem of illegal
armed groups is also discussed.
Key Findings
Summary of findings
• Naming of six suspects draws mixed reactions and deepens divisions within
the Coalition Government
• Politicisation of the ICC intervention increases impetus for ethno-political
alliances ahead of 2012 elections
• There is a disconnect between the political elite and ordinary citizens with
regard to the fight against impunity
• The ICC intervention continues to enjoy high public confidence
• In addition to the ICC intervention, Kenyans want a local mechanism to
prosecute low-level perpetrators of violence
The State of Peace and Security
11. By the end of 2010 and early 2011, there was consensus in all counties of Kenya that the
socio-political situation had improved and was far better than it was in the post-election
violence period. Political violence ended after the signing of the National Accord. Although
2009 witnessed increased insecurity in some areas, these incidents did not escalate and did
not result from political conflicts relating to the 2007 General Election.
12. In many counties, respondents observed that there was peace and calm. Many also said they
felt much safer than in 2008 and 2009. For instance, when asked what they felt about their
3

so named after Justice Philip Waki, who chaired the Commission.
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lives, only 9 per cent of the respondents said life was not good at all. Another 30 per cent
said life was not very good. However, close to 50 per cent said life was just good and another
12 per cent said life was very good.
Figure 1: Thinking about your life at present, which of the following is applicable? (December 2010)

Thinking about your life at present, which of the following is
applicable?

My life currently is not good at all

9%
30%

My life currently is not very good

49%

My life currently is just good
My life currently is very good

12%

13. A trend analysis from 2008 to Dec. 2010 also shows that many people believe the situation
in the country is better today. Up to 64 per cent of Kenyans believe that life is far better now
than was it was in 2008 and 2009. The number of people who feel the situation is worse
decreased from 76 per cent in August 2009 to 59 per cent in February 2010. Only 18 per cent
held this view by the end of 2010.
Figure 2: Thinking about Kenya today compared to just after the 2007 general election,
has the situation become better, worse, or stayed the same?

14. The feelings of a better life and the situation in the country are again reflected in how people
feel about safety. Asked what they think about safety now compared to just after the 2007
elections, 72 per cent of respondents said they felt safer. The people who feel that life is the
same are almost equal in number to those who feel it is less safe, at 14 and 13 per cent,
respectively.
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Figure 3: Thinking of your safety now compared to just after the 2007 elections,
do you feel safer, less safe, or about the same?
Thinking of your safety now compared to just after the
2007 general elections, do you feel safer, less safe, or
about the same?

15. The number of people feeling safer has been increasing since 2008. This corroborates the
findings on feelings about improvement of life and security in general.
Figure 4: Thinking about your safety now compared to just after the 2007 elections,
do you feel safer, less safer or about the same?

16. Although 64 per cent of Kenyans feel the situation is better now, the Coast region has more
people who feel less safe: 41 per cent of the respondents. Less than half the population in
Lamu and Tana River counties do not feel safer than they did after the 2007 elections.
17. Counties in northern Kenya feel less safe compared to other areas of the country. Banditry,
resource conflicts, food insecurity and external incursions by foreign militia contribute to
this feeling in these counties. Counties affected by the post-election violence, however, have
many people feeling safer and thinking that life is better than it was after the 2007 elections.
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Table 1: Thinking about Kenya today compared to the time of the 2007 General Election,
has the situation become better, worse, or stayed the same? (by county)
County

Better

Worse

18%

Stayed
about the
same
9%

KIRINYAGA

69%

MURANG'A

74%

17%

NYANDARUA

73%

NYERI

County

Better

Worse

KISUMU

60%

19%

Stayed
about the
same
21%

10%

MIGORI

56%

31%

12%

14%

12%

SIAYA

65%

15%

19%

78%

12%

11%

KISII

53%

30%

15%

KIAMBU

70%

8%

21%

NYAMIRA

62%

23%

15%

KILIFI

35%

30%

32%

BARINGO

69%

17%

13%

MOMBASA

45%

30%

25%

BOMET

54%

26%

20%

KWALE

41%

30%

27%

KAJIADO

72%

14%

14%

LAMU

36%

22%

42%

KERICHO

61%

20%

17%

TAITA TAVETA

40%

23%

33%

NANDI

59%

32%

9%

TANA RIVER

54%

23%

21%

NAROK

63%

22%

14%

EMBU

51%

32%

17%

TRANS NZOIA

48%

31%

21%

MAKUENI

68%

7%

26%

TURKANA

85%

11%

5%

KITUI

73%

17%

8%

UASIN GISHU

61%

21%

18%

MACHAKOS

73%

10%

17%

WEST POKOT

45%

30%

24%

MERU

81%

10%

9%

NAKURU

75%

16%

9%

ISIOLO

80%

6%

13%

ELGEYO/MARAKWET

56%

26%

18%

MARSABIT

46%

9%

44%

LAIKIPIA

75%

12%

14%

THARAKA

77%

12%

11%

SAMBURU

70%

8%

22%

NAIROBI

66%

17%

17%

BUSIA

60%

20%

18%

GARISSA

72%

6%

21%

VIHIGA

73%

17%

8%

WAJIR

43%

16%

40%

BUNGOMA

72%

12%

15%

MANDERA

66%

13%

21%

KAKAMEGA

70%

10%

19%

HOMA BAY

68%

20%

11%

18. These findings corroborate what previous surveys revealed regarding fear of violence
recurring: many Kenyans are confident violence is not likely to recur. In December 2010, 64
per cent of the population did not think there would be violence around the next General
Election. Only a small number – 12 per cent – thought there would be violence while 23 per
cent were not certain.
19. Kenyans feel that rising crime and youth unemployment, rather than political violence
relating to the ICC process, presents the greatest threat to security. The Annual Crime
Report, 2010, shows a 5 per cent decrease in all categories of crime. However, it also shows a
relatively high increase of crime in places such as Nairobi and North Eastern. This could be
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attributed to the high unemployment rates, inequitable distribution of resources, organised
crime, drug and substance abuse, high illiteracy and access to sophisticated technology.4 The
survey carried out in the 47 counties shows that 34 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively,
regard youth unemployment and crime as the greatest threat to security.
Table 2: What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live?
What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live?
Lack of police presence

9%

Youth unemployment

34%

Crime, e.g., robbery

27%

Tribalism

6%

There are no threats

21%

Drug abuse

1%

20. All the regions of the country identify youth unemployment and crime as the greatest threats
to security. Tribalism is significant as a factor in Northern Kenya.
Table 3: What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live
– Analysis by region
What in your view is the greatest threat to security in the area where you live?

Lack of police
presence
Youth
unemployment
Crime e.g.
robbery
Tribalism
There are no
threats

Central

Coast

Eastern

Nairobi

Nyanza

R/Valley

Western

8%

North
Eastern
10%

9%

6%

17%

10%

7%

5%

38%

32%

40%

32%

37%

38%

28%

37%

29%

25%

21%

37%

9%

34%

27%

29%

2%

6%

5%

5%

19%

4%

8%

5%

19%

26%

16%

17%

24%

13%

28%

23%

21. The findings show that the political situation has normalised and that peace obtains in the
country. Whether this is sustainable and, specifically, can be secured in the longer term is
dependent on how politicians will begin organising campaigns for the next presidential
election because violence often accompanies competition for the presidency. Sustainability
of peace will also depend on the nature of national level political dynamics because conflicts
between leaders tend to trickle down to the local level and ultimately affect inter-communal
relations. It will also depend on whether action against impunity is taken and sustained.
Furthermore, Agenda Item 4 reforms have not been comprehensively addressed yet the
window for radical decisions will shut as the country moves towards the next General
Election.
4

Government of Kenya, Annual Crime Report for the Year 2010, p.1
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The ICC and the Kenya Situation
22. The previous review report noted that since March 2010 when the Pre-Trial Chamber II of
the International Criminal Court approved the Chief Prosecutor’s request to investigate the
Kenya situation, political anxiety heightened threats against potential witnesses and
institutions that have investigated the post election violence, including the Kenyan National
Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR).5

23. Secondly, political realignments emerged with a view to securing the interests and political
careers of senior politicians. Thirdly, the reality of ICC intervention caused anxiety among
influential leaders because this is the first time powerful individuals are publicly being held
accountable through mechanisms that they have no control over. Since December 2010
when the ICC Prosecutor named the six suspects, the political terrain has changed. Some
leaders have used public spaces including the media and public rallies to claim that the ICC
intervention is part of political calculations to eliminate their candidacy in the 2012 general
elections.

24. Acrimonious public spats between those supporting the ICC trials and those against it have
roused ethnic sentiments, particularly because some say they were the real victims of the
violence while others say their community is being targeted. Some have expressed concern
about the omission of some leaders from areas such as Kisumu, where violence also
occurred.6 Allegations that the ICC cases are politically-motivated has cast the debate in the
light of 2012 politics and obscured the fight against impunity. A respondent in Nairobi
remarked ‘The fear of exclusion from power in 2012 makes people anxious; it is introducing
ethnic dimensions to the debate. If this political and ethnic discussion is allowed to
continue, it will obliterate the real issues and present a real danger in 2012’7
25. There had been fears that naming the suspects would lead to violence, especially in areas
that witnessed intense violent conflicts. This did not materialise. People were not surprised
by some of the names; the announcement confirmed public speculations honed over months
especially because some politicians had began engaging the ICC on suspicion that they were
targets of investigations. Furthermore, after their naming, these leaders implored their
respective communities to be calm. Community elders, youth leaders and NGOs also called
on people to be peaceful. However, continued ethnicization of the ICC debate is causing fear
of violence among people at the local level.8
Kenyans are supportive of the ICC
26. The surveys reveal that Kenyans are very supportive of the ICC investigations. Interviews
with key informants and ordinary people corroborate this finding. To some, the ICC action
represents the only concrete action to hold powerful people accountable for post-election
violence.9 Still, others are happy that the ICC has acted fast and argue that it is an important
lesson to influential and powerful people who always perpetuate impunity by failing to

5

Interview with an official of KNCHR, 10 Nov 2010; also Daily Nation, ‘Ruto accuses rights body of coaching witnesses’ 9 Nov 2010,
Press statement by KNCHR, 12 Nov 2010.
6 FGD in Kericho County, 20 Dec 2010
7 Interview with a university lecturer in Nairobi, 31 March 2011; also ‘ICC cases politically motivated: Interview with lawyer Kithure
Kindiki’ reported in The Star, 4 April 2011, p. 24
8 Wanyeki, M., ‘Back to the Future: Prepare for the worst in 2011’ The East African, 4-10 April, 2011, p. 16
9 Interview with a government official, 17 Dec 2010
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account for their actions.10
27. Although some political elite have espoused solidarity with those named, ordinary citizens
are happy that at last those suspected to bear the greatest responsibility and in particular
senior people are being called to account. In December, as many as 78 per cent Kenyans
were happy that ICC was conducting investigations. Figure 5 shows that only 15 per cent
were somewhat/very unhappy with this development.
Figure 5: How happy or unhappy are you that ICC is investigating – National level

How happy or unhappy are you that the ICC is
investigating perpetrators of post election violence?
Dec.-10

90%
78%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

15%

20%
6%

10%
0%

Very/somewhat happy Somewhat/very unhappy Don’t care/don’t know

28. However, counties in the Rift Valley region are the least happy with the ICC action. Up to 54
per cent of respondents in Bomet County, 45 per cent in Kericho, and 32 per cent in Uasin
Gishu County are unhappy that the ICC is investigating perpetrators of post-election
violence. Earlier reports have shown that people in these regions prefer the Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission to take action.
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Interview with a human rights advocate in Uasin Gishu County, 24 Dec 2010
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Table 4: How happy or unhappy with ICC – by county
How happy or unhappy are you that the ICC is investigating perpetrators of post election violence?
County
KIRINYAGA

78%

Not
Happy
13%

MURANG'A

78%

13%

0%

8%

MIGORI

88%

9%

1%

2%

NYANDARUA

85%

12%

0%

2%

SIAYA

87%

10%

1%

2%

NYERI

78%

12%

6%

4%

KISII

75%

17%

0%

7%

KIAMBU

83%

15%

1%

0%

NYAMIRA

89%

6%

0%

6%

KILIFI

77%

7%

1%

15%

BARINGO

62%

31%

1%

4%

MOMBASA

81%

16%

0%

2%

BOMET

35%

54%

3%

6%

KWALE

79%

9%

2%

9%

KAJIADO

77%

18%

0%

6%

LAMU

92%

7%

1%

0%

KERICHO

48%

45%

3%

4%

TAITA
TAVETA
TANA RIVER

75%

8%

1%

16%

NANDI

65%

28%

3%

3%

72%

12%

0%

16%

NAROK

71%

24%

0%

6%

EMBU

87%

7%

2%

3%

TRANS NZOIA

74%

20%

2%

4%

MAKUENI

88%

8%

0%

2%

TURKANA

88%

12%

0%

0%

KITUI

89%

3%

0%

9%

UASIN GISHU

66%

32%

2%

1%

MACHAKOS

83%

12%

1%

4%

WEST POKOT

50%

29%

5%

14%

MERU

84%

10%

0%

6%

NAKURU

84%

10%

3%

2%

ISIOLO

73%

2%

8%

17%

ELGEYO/MARAKWET

68%

31%

1%

0%

MARSABIT

63%

29%

3%

5%

LAIKIPIA

78%

18%

4%

0%

THARAKA

77%

21%

0%

2%

SAMBURU

56%

11%

1%

33%

NAIROBI

89%

9%

0%

1%

BUSIA

74%

16%

2%

7%

GARISSA

87%

4%

2%

6%

VIHIGA

87%

6%

1%

7%

WAJIR

73%

14%

9%

4%

BUNGOMA

67%

25%

1%

7%

MANDERA

90%

8%

0%

0%

KAKAMEGA

83%

12%

3%

HOMA BAY

Happy

86%

9%

Don't
care
5%

3%

KISUMU

1%

DK

4%

County

Happy
89%

Not
Happy
8%

Don't
care
1%

DK
2%

2%
11

29. Overall, one quarter of the people in Rift Valley is somewhat/very unhappy with the ICC
investigations. People in other regions – and counties – are very/somewhat happy with the
investigations. Nairobi is leading at 89 per cent, followed by North Eastern and Nyanza at 85
per cent each.
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RTA has been excluded
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Figure 6: How happy or unhappy are you that the ICC is investigating perpetrators of post election
violence (by region)

30. People are also confident that the ICC will eventually prosecute those named as perpetrators
of violence. Up to 69 per cent of respondents said they were confident that the ICC will do so
-- 39 per cent being very confident and 33 per cent just confident. 24 per cent were not
confident on prosecutions.
Figure 7: Level of confidence in the ICC

How confident are you that the ICC will prosecute senior
people?
Confident

69%
24%

Not Confident

7%

Don't know

RTA

11

0%

31. The number of those who are confident about ICC prosecuting the perpetrators varies across
the regions. North Eastern region has more people (82%) who are confident about the ICC.
Western and Nyanza regions follow at 75 per cent. In Eastern Province, there are 74 per cent
who are confident. Rift Valley has the least number of people – 60 per cent – who are
confident that the ICC will prosecute those suspected to be responsible.
32. In the Rift Valley and Central regions, where some of the people named by the ICC
prosecutor come from, 33 per cent and 27 per cent respectively say they are not confident
that ICC will prosecute these people.
Figure 8: Confidence in the ICC (by region)
100%
80%
Confident
60%
40%

Not
Confident

20%
DK
0%

33. In many counties people are very confident that the ICC will prosecute the suspects.
However, less than half the population in some counties in Rift Valley are confident in this
regard. For instance, only 32 per cent in Bomet and 40 per cent in Kericho are confident that
the ICC will prosecute these people.
34. The level of confidence in the ICC remained high even after the naming of suspects. In
March 2011, 72 per cent of the respondents expressed confidence that the ICC will prosecute
the suspects:
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Figure 9: Level of confidence in the ICC, March 2011

How confident are you that the ICC will prosecute senior
people who perpetrated PEV?
No response
Don't Know/Not
sure
Not Confident
Confident

13

1%
10%
16%
72%

Table 5: Following the ICC chief prosecutor's investigations in Kenya, how confident are you that the ICC
or The Hague will prosecute senior people who perpetrated post-election violence?12
County

Confident

Not
Confident
23%

DK

County

Confident

10%

KISUMU

80%

Not
Confident
15%

DK

KIRINYAGA

66%

5%

MURANG'A

66%

25%

9%

MIGORI

78%

20%

2%

NYANDARUA

76%

21%

3%

SIAYA

80%

15%

5%

NYERI

69%

24%

7%

KISII

61%

27%

11%

KIAMBU

65%

32%

3%

NYAMIRA

84%

14%

3%

KILIFI

63%

16%

20%

BARINGO

59%

31%

8%

MOMBASA

65%

31%

4%

BOMET

32%

56%

12%

KWALE

67%

20%

14%

KAJIADO

72%

21%

6%

LAMU

77%

15%

7%

KERICHO

40%

50%

10%

TAITA
TAVETA
TANA RIVER

55%

24%

21%

NANDI

62%

29%

10%

69%

13%

18%

NAROK

61%

31%

7%

EMBU

60%

24%

16%

TRANS NZOIA

61%

33%

6%

MAKUENI

80%

14%

5%

TURKANA

89%

11%

0%

KITUI

82%

8%

10%

UASIN GISHU

58%

39%

3%

MACHAKOS

76%

18%

5%

WEST POKOT

46%

38%

16%

MERU

76%

16%

7%

NAKURU

65%

29%

6%

ISIOLO

69%

13%

18%

66%

31%

3%

MARSABIT

51%

37%

11%

ELGEYO/MAR
AKWET
LAIKIPIA

63%

36%

1%

THARAKA

64%

33%

3%

SAMBURU

43%

20%

37%

NAIROBI

70%

28%

2%

BUSIA

73%

19%

8%

GARISSA

85%

5%

9%

VIHIGA

86%

7%

7%

WAJIR

73%

16%

11%

BUNGOMA

67%

26%

7%

MANDERA

85%

12%

3%

KAKAMEGA

82%

15%

4%

HOMA BAY

76%

18%

6%

35. Confidence in the ICC has been increasing. Those who were confident increased from 52 per
cent in May 2010 to 69 per cent in December 2010. As shown above, this number increased
to 72 per cent at the end of March 2011.

12

RTA has been excluded
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Figure 10: How confident are you that the ICC will prosecute senior people
who perpetrated the post-election violence?

How confident are you that the ICC will
prosecute senior people who perpetrated postelection violence?
May-10

Jun-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

80%
72%
69%
70%
63%
60%
52%
50%

36%

40%
29%
30%

24%
16%

20%

2% 3%

10%

8%

7%

10%

5%
0%

0%

0% 1% 0% 1%

0%
Confident

Not confident

Not aware of the
prosecution process

DK

RTA

36. Although the majority said they are confident, 16 per cent of those who said they are not
confident expressed concern that the ICC may fail to gather sufficient evidence to obtain
convictions. Others thought the ICC process has been politicised and therefore unlikely to
meet the objectives that resonate with the people of Kenya regarding the fight against
impunity. Some raised concern about possible bribery of witnesses and other actors as the
trials progress.
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Figure 11: Not confident in the ICC

39%

Why are you not confident?

20%

19%
10%

Lack of
sufficient
evidence

ICC process
has been
politicised -

Lack of
government
cooperation

Suspect will
bribe their
way through

6%

ICC Process
will take too
long

6%

Other

37. The majority of the people will support the trials or do nothing if a senior politician from
their community is held accountable for the post-election violence. with regard to them. A
small percentage – around 4 per cent – will violently attack members of another community.
In fact, the number of people who will support the trial has increased from around 52 per
cent in May 2010 when people were not very confident that ICC would name suspects who
bear the greatest responsibility to 69 per cent in December 2010 when people were certain
that the ICC decision was firm.
38. The survey also sought to find out how people and their communities would react in the
event that senior people from their community would eventually be put on trial. Up to 64 per
cent of respondents said they would support the trials and another 51 per cent thought
members of their community would also support the trials.
Figure 11: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election violence,
how are you personally likely to react?
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Figure 12: If a senior politician from your ethnic group (community) is put on trial,
how are members of your community likely to react?

If a senior politician from your ethnic group(Community) is put on
trial, how are members of your community likely to react?
May-10

Jun-10

Dec-10

60%

51%

50%
45%

41%

40%

32%
29%

30%

20%

20%
15%

15%

13%

9%

10%
7%

6%

7%

4%
3%
1%

1%

0%
Violently attack members of
other community
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Do nothing

Support the trial

Protest against the
arrest/trial of the politician

DK

RTA

1%

Table 6: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election
violence, how would you react? (by county)
I would
engage in
acts of
violence
against
other
communities

I would
demonstrat
e against the
trial

I would
suppor
t the
trial

I would
do
nothing

I would
demonstrat
e against the
trial

I would
suppor
t the
trial

I would
do
nothin
g

KISUMU

I would
engage in
acts of
violence
against
other
communitie
s
0%

KIRINYAGA

0%

6%

77%

17%

4%

39%

56%

MURANG'A

0%

14%

69%

16%

MIGORI

3%

4%

71%

22%

NYANDARUA

0%

4%

77%

18%

SIAYA

0%

10%

59%

30%

NYERI

0%

3%

72%

25%

KISII

2%

5%

63%

27%

KIAMBU

3%

14%

70%

12%

NYAMIRA

0%

5%

74%

21%

KILIFI

0%

4%

70%

24%

BARINGO

0%

9%

54%

31%

MOMBASA

1%

5%

68%

26%

BOMET

8%

12%

32%

44%

KWALE

0%

2%

60%

38%

KAJIADO

1%

10%

66%

21%

LAMU

0%

0%

69%

28%

KERICHO

3%

14%

34%

47%

TAITA
TAVETA
TANA RIVER

1%

1%

78%

16%

NANDI

4%

6%

37%

51%

0%

3%

74%

22%

NAROK

2%

6%

60%

28%

EMBU

0%

2%

79%

17%

TRANS NZOIA

0%

9%

59%

30%

MAKUENI

0%

3%

84%

12%

TURKANA

10%

20%

65%

5%

KITUI

1%

4%

63%

31%

UASIN GISHU

1%

7%

43%

49%

MACHAKOS

0%

5%

76%

19%

WEST POKOT

3%

11%

53%

32%

MERU

0%

2%

80%

15%

NAKURU

1%

4%

58%

34%

ISIOLO

1%

5%

49%

35%

1%

19%

35%

42%

MARSABIT

0%

11%

47%

21%

ELGEYO/MARAKWE
T
LAIKIPIA

2%

6%

71%

20%

THARAKA

0%

9%

69%

16%

SAMBURU

2%

3%

55%

35%

NAIROBI

0%

5%

76%

19%

BUSIA

0%

14%

57%

25%

GARISSA

2%

6%

81%

11%

VIHIGA

1%

5%

68%

25%

WAJIR

4%

14%

65%

14%

BUNGOMA

2%

9%

65%

20%

MANDERA

1%

7%

77%

14%

KAKAMEGA

4%

12%

56%

28%

HOMA BAY

0%

8%

55%

36%

39. It appears that many people would like the prosecution to take place. Many people would
also like other perpetrators – the middle and lower level – to be tried. They want them tried
in a Special Tribunal and in Kenyan courts. Only a small number – under 10 per cent –
would like them to be forgiven.
40. 4 per cent of respondents expected community members to attack people from other
communities if their political leaders were held accountable. This suggests that there are still
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pockets of people who can be mobilised for political violence in future.13 Once again,
counties in the Rift Valley region have relatively fewer people who say they would support
the trials because a significant population would hold demonstrate against such trials. Other
counties have relatively more people who say they would support trials. Because of the threat
this small group presents, people support a local mechanism to deal with low- and middlelevel perpetrators.
41. The survey asked what people thought should be done to the rest of the suspected
perpetrators. As many as 42 per cent suggested that middle and lower level perpetrators
should be tried in Kenyan courts while 36 per cent wanted them tried by a special tribunal.
Only 10 per cent of the respondents wanted them forgiven while 7 per cent thought the
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission should handle the matter.
Figure 13: What do you think should be done to the rest of the suspected perpetrators of post-election
violence?14

What do you think should be done to the rest of the suspect perpetrators
of post election violence?
50%
40%

May-10

42%

42%
36% 35%

Jun-10

30%
20%
10%

10%

7%

10%
3%

6% 5%

Dec-10
1% 0%

1% 0%

0%
Try them in Try them in Take them Forgiveness
a special
Kenyan to the TJRC to promote
tribunal
Courts
unity

DK

RTA

Other

41. These findings suggest widespread public support for ICC and the trial of those prosecuted.
Although the population in Rift Valley is less inclined than everybody else to support the
trial, it is not necessarily likely to engage in violence. In Rift Valley, 52 per cent of
respondents said they would support the trials, 10 per cent would demonstrate against them,
34 per cent would do nothing while only 3 per cent said they were likely to react violently
against other communities.
42. Public support for a local tribunal has remained high. The March 2011 survey shows that 77
per cent of would like to see the rest of the perpetrators tried through a local mechanism. Of
13
14

Interviews in Londiani, Kericho County, 27 Dec 2010
Only data for May 2010 and December 2010 included
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these, 48 per cent prefer a Special Tribunal as recommended by the Commission on the Post
Election Violence 9 (CIPEV) while 29 per cent would like them tried by existing local courts.
These views resonate strongly with the government’s renewed commitment to reform the
judiciary and the police, as articulated in its application for deferral at the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber.15
Figure 14: What do you think should be done with the rest of the perpetrators? March 2011

Apart from the six, what do you think should be done with the rest of the
perpetrators?
No response
Don't know/Not sure
Take them to Hague
Forgive them/amnesty
Take them to the TJRC
Try them in Kenyan courts
Try them in special tribunal

2%
5%
4%
7%
5%
29%
48%

The ICC and Political Alliances against Accountability
43. The ICC Chief Prosecutor’s naming of suspects has aroused general anxiety among some
politicians, who have resorted to politicising the investigation of the Kenya situation. From
questioning at political rallies the objectivity of these investigations to alleging mischief
intended to lock out some influential people from the 2012 presidential election, the
discourses have sought to generate public anxiety about some ethnic exclusion in the
country’s next political dispensation.16 To them, those named by the prosecutor are victims
of political rivalry17 and that ‘the ICC is being used to eliminate political rivals for the
presidential race.’18 There are also those who have raised concerns about three of the people
named coming from one community in the Rift Valley, arguing that their community is
being targeted. These discourses have reinforced a siege mentality among those in Rift
Valley. Mention of the three suspects is consistent with local level discourses about one
community being systematically targeted, isolated and excluded from the country’s power
arrangements.19
44. These discourses have shifted public focus and debate away from the criminal nature of the
post-election violence to the politics of the presidential election. They have prevented public
debate on how to address impunity and hold political leaders accountable. The political
15

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Application on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC
Statute’ Public Document No. ICC-01/09-01/00 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 31 March 2011
16 Interviews in Uasin Gishu, Kericho and Nairobi counties, 19 – 24 Dec 2010; also Githongo J, ‘Now that Ocampo has Dropped his
Bombshell, We Must Watch our Step’ The East African, 20-26 Dec 2010, p. 19
17Interview with a human rights activist in Uasin Gishu County, 20 Dec 2010; see also Hansard Report of the Prime Minister’s
Statement, ‘Government Statement on the ICC Process’, 16 Dec 2010
18 Interview with a community elder in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu County, 20 Dec 2010
19 FGD with youth leaders in Uasin Gishu County, 12 Oct 2010; also Salim Lone, ‘Feeling of Isolation among Kalenjin Could again
Divide Kenya’, Daily Nation, 6 Jan 2010
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attention that the matter has received has meant little focus on how to foster accountability
and secure justice for victims.
45. While some allege their community is being targeted, others argue that they were the real
victims of the post-election crisis and all they did was respond to the cries of distress from
victims. These discourses have roused ethnic sympathies, which have in turn been whipped
up to rationalise the formation of ethno-political alliances as a platform to wage their fight
against prosecution and by extension, package their political ambitions. New ethno-regional
alliances have formed especially comprising the main protagonists during the post-election
violence in Rift Valley. Thus, the ICC action has inadvertently created opportunities for
rapprochement between those who fought during the violence, in spite of the deep mistrust
between them at the local level. But to some respondents, personal interests among these
politicians are responsible for this; they are uniting against accountability and to perpetuate
impunity: ‘They are uniting now because they did not have their way. If the list had ruined
the political careers of their rivals, there would be no calls to repeal the International
Crimes Act.’20
46. These discourses have put the country in a premature election campaign mode and are
constraining effective implementation of the New Constitution. The ethnic polarisation that
is emerging due to resurgence of hate speech and emotive remarks at political rallies against
the ICC and political rivals suggests that the country’s political leadership must not allow
debate on fighting impunity to be overshadowed by political discourses.
47. Political interests must not override the reform agenda or be allowed to mobilise violence
ahead of 2012. They must not be allowed to obscure the urge for reforms. Although the
voices of politicians are most audible, members of the public are supportive of prosecutions
and would not like a repeat of 2007. Ordinary citizens are keen to see senior people and
other suspects prosecuted. However, political supporters are likely to support a call to
violence. In the March 2011 survey, 65 per cent think violence is unlikely to recur in 2012.
However, 17 per cent violence may occur; and of 21 per cent of these believe supporters will
cause violence if senior politicians are held accountable.
Failure to investigate and prosecute
48. There are concerns about failure to investigate and prosecute. Of all the crimes committed
during the crisis period, only one person has been successfully prosecuted and convicted.21
Suspects charged with the infamous arson attack on the Kiambaa church in Eldoret were
acquitted in April 2009 for lack of evidence. A police officer caught on camera shooting
protesters to death was also acquitted in June 2010 for want of proper investigation and
prosecution. The fate of the cases that have gone to court, and the numerous others that
have not, is a sufficient pointer to lack of political will and adequate capacity to conduct
investigations to support successful prosecutions. The manner in which some of the
country’s political leaders have reacted to and treated the ICC process has also added to the
pessimism about political commitment to hold perpetrators accountable. One respondent in
particular posed: ‘‘Has anything changed to make anyone think the country is now
committed to stamping out impunity?’22 And one MP, while commenting about the
20

Interview with a Businessman in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu County, 17 Dec 2010
The Standard, 16 December 2010
22 Evans-Pritchard Blake, ‘Kenya’s tribunal pledges questioned’ Questioned’ Jan 2010
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discussion to withdraw Kenya from the Rome Statute noted: ‘I am wondering about this
sudden change of heart. Is it sincere? Why did it not come before Ocampo disclosed his list?
.... This is not genuine; are we saying we are untouchable, we cannot even be
investigated?’23’
49. The government’s application to the ICC challenging admissibility of the two cases cites the
progress the country has made to restore public confidence in the judiciary and the police.
The application notes that the enactment of the new constitution and the provisions on the
Bill of Rights will ensure fair trials and procedural guarantees within the criminal justice
system. It argues that national courts will now be capable of trying crimes from the postelection violence, including the ICC cases without the need for legislation to create a special
tribunal. It also outlines a six-month time-table for carrying out the reforms and trials.24
50. This application notwithstanding, there is need to note that Parliament failed to establish a
Special Tribunal. Many MPs supported trials at The Hague because they feared that the local
judicial process would be interfered with. They only turned around to demand for a local
mechanism once they knew who was on the list. Some of the political leaders also rejected
the idea of a Special Tribunal arguing that the local judiciary was corrupt and beholden to
special interests. These are clear signs that some of the political leaders would want to
thwart the ICC process so as to evade accountability.
51.

Some Kenyans are generally sceptical about the sincerity of the government to fulfil its
pledge to fight impunity because of the above contradictory positions by some leaders
including some in government. Also this scepticism springs largely from the fact that there
have been attempts to influence appointments to key institutions of governance. They are
also sceptical that three years after the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation
Agreement, there has been little progress in prosecuting post-election violence cases, as
Table 7 shows.

‘Repeal of International Crimes Act’ The Hansard, 22 Dec 2010
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Application on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC
Statute’ ICC Public Document No. ICC-01/0-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 31 March 2011
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Table 7: Steps in the fight against impunity
31-Jan-11

Revive debate on Special Tribunal
AU summit supports Kenya

11-Jan-10

The VP begins diplomatic efforts to
support deferral
22-Dec-10
Parliament votes to repeal International
Crimes Act (Rome Statute)
15-Dec-10
ICC names 6 suspects
May-10
31-Mar-10
26-Nov-09
14-Nov-09
30-Jul-09
14-Jul-09

ICC investigators arrive in Kenya
Authorization granted

ICC prosecutor seeks authorisation to investigate

No quorum for Special Tribunal Bill

2nd Bill rejected, vote for The Hague

Cabinet rejects Bill on special tribunal

8-Jul-09
3-Jul-09
12-Feb-09
27-Jan-09

4-Mar-08
Feb-08

Constitution of Kenya amendment Bill, 2009 on special tribunal defeated
Parliament adopts report

16-Dec-08

The Principals sign an agreement on implementation

4-Dec-08

Cabinet discusses CIPEV report

16-Oct-08
22-May-08

Kofi Annan hands 'secret envelope' to ICC and supporting
materials
Kenyan Govt. committees to ICC to establish a local mechanism

CIPEV submits report

President appoints CIPEV commissioners

Mediation team signs agreement to establish CIPEV

National Accord signed, violence halted

52. The table also shows that the government failed to set up a Special Tribunal in spite of
extension of agreed deadlines. A statute for the establishment of the Special Tribunal should
have been enacted by 1 February 2009, after the Waki report was adopted by Parliament on
27 January 2009. Notwithstanding the delay between the date set for a Special Tribunal and
the adoption of the Waki report by Parliament, the Bill to establish the Tribunal was
defeated in Parliament on 12 February 2009. Another time limit was set for August 2009.
Again the government failed to set the Special Tribunal by this date. The government had
also begun consultations with the ICC on the subject. Consequently, as required by CIPEV,
the Panel handed to the ICC the sealed envelope containing the Commission’s
recommendations for further investigations. Even after the matter had been handed over,
Parliament again failed to pass the Bill for the Special Tribunal.
Cooperating with ICC
53. As mentioned above, the contradictory behaviour by MPs has led the public to question
whether or not the Government will fully cooperate with the ICC. Cooperation with the ICC
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has two elements. First, States are required to put in place domestic legislation that enables
them to assist the court as and when requested. Secondly, States have a general obligation to
cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and collection of evidence, arrest and surrender
of suspects, extension of privileges and immunities to officers of the court, protection of
victims and witnesses and the enforcement of ICC orders for fines and forfeiture. 25
54. Until the recent efforts to withdraw Kenya from the Rome Statute and to defer the Kenya
case, the Government had taken steps to cooperate with the ICC. In December 2008 Kenya
enacted the International Crimes Act to domesticate the Rome Statute. In September 2010
the Government signed the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International
Criminal Court, which enabled ICC officials to conduct investigations in Kenya.
55. Secondly, a Kenyan judge was appointed to support the investigations by being present as
investigators took statements from senior security officials. Dialogue has been going on
regarding the production of relevant official documents and the protection of witnesses and
victims of the post-election violence. More cooperation would be expected in the event that
the arrest or surrender of suspects is required. Cooperation is also expected in the event that
there is a need for enforcement of orders, forfeiture of proceeds, seizure of property or assets
that any accused person may have acquired as a result of the crime and in case there is a
need to give effect to awards of reparations to victims.26 Kenya is also obligated to extend its
criminal laws to penalize offences against the court’s administration of justice and to submit
cases of such offences to the prosecutor.
56. The Government has all along pledged to cooperate with the ICC but recent developments
suggest that full and effective cooperation may be constrained by differences between the
two parties in the coalition. These signs include the demand by some MPs that Kenya
withdraws from ICC. Related to this is also the quest to defer the Kenyan case, as well as the
argument that a New Constitution provides an opportunity to reconstitute the judicial
mechanisms in a manner that would enable the country to try the suspects.
57. This argument attempts to sidestep the real reasons why the Waki Commission
recommended establishing a Special Tribunal for Kenya or, in the alternative, passing the
post-election violence cases to the ICC. The first was that investigations on PEV are weak
and prosecutions half-hearted. The problems in Kenya’s judiciary are only part of the poor
infrastructure that has nurtured impunity. Out of the hundreds of homicides committed
during the post-election period, only a few headline cases have gone to court, and all of them
been dismissed because the investigations were poor or insufficient and the prosecution
unconvincing. Three years since the commission made its recommendations, no concrete
action has been taken to effect its recommendations to overhaul the police service, set up an
independent prosecutorial service, and bring those officers within its ranks who were
responsible for specific crimes during the post-election violence to justice.
58. It is important to also note that the Coalition Government lacks cohesion and presents
different and opposed views on the ICC matter. Lack of cohesion within the coalition and the
absence of a common position on the ICC will result in possibly one party of the Government
25 Jackson N Maogoto, “A Giant without Limbs: The International Criminal Court’s State-Centric Cooperation Regime”. University of
New Castle, 2006
26 Article 93 of the Rome Statute
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seeking to cooperate and the other party opposing ICC investigations. The differences in the
perceptions of the two parties have deepened internal party divisions. These divisions have
widened further after failing to agree on whether or not to lobby the African Union to
support Kenya’s quest for deferral of its case at the ICC through the United Nations Security
Council. Given these developments, cooperation with the ICC is highly politicised, difficult to
obtain and if obtained it is possible that the ICC will be subjected to political intricacies.
59. Some Kenyans believe that prosecution or other measures to fight against impunity are
crucial to preventing future violence. More people want action against suspected
perpetrators because this will prevent future violence. A displaced person observed that ‘The
ICC is the only option left to fight impunity in Kenya because the institutions and the
politicians have failed. Ocampo cannot fail. He must not fail. If he does, that will be the end
of Kenya because there will be nothing left to fear anymore.’27
Figure 13: What would you say is the most important way to prevent future violence in Kenya?

What would you say is the most important way to
prevent future violence in Kenya?

60.

Many Kenyans see the ICC investigation as an opportunity to fight impunity. It is not a
threat to peace and security. Some Kenyans also want accountability over the post-election
violence; they want justice through prosecutions. There is thus a clear disconnect between
ordinary Kenyans and some politicians, particularly MPs.

Illegally Armed Groups in the Society
61. The KNDR agreement required illegally armed groups to be demobilised. The previous
three review reports have shown that illegally armed groups are no longer conspicuous or
visible as was the case in 2008 and 2009. Some transformed from informal agents of
political violence to organised criminal gangs. The reports also noted that organised

27

Displaced person in Uasin Gishu, December 2010
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criminal gangs had grown wealthy and powerful from extortion, kidnapping for ransom and
collecting illegal taxes in urban informal settlements. It was found that in some parts of the
country, they had taken over control of the transport industry, which they were running
through extortion cartels. They were additionally found to have control of security in urban
informal settlements, where they collect ‘protection fees’ from tenants, landlords and
businesses.
62.

The visibility of these groups and their activities has reduced significantly. The absence of
major overt political competitions that would have required these groups is responsible for
their low visibility. Campaigns for the referendum would have provided this opportunity
but parties in the Coalition Government were generally not opposed to each other.
Secondly, the Government enacted the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act and proscribed
33 groups. Within the framework of this law, the Government revived efforts to ‘crack
down’ on suspected members of these groups, notably in Nairobi, Central and Rift Valley
provinces. The Government has also been keen to secure watertight evidence against gangs
for prosecution purposes and to protect witnesses who testify against them.28

63.

Many respondents across the counties do not cite awareness of the existence of such groups
any more. However, the survey reveals that some groups still operate in Central, Nairobi,
Coast and Nyanza regions. Interestingly, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ groups, they are all
involved in ‘security’ activities, of which some community members are appreciative.

64.

Although these groups are not as active as they were in the past, the failure to prosecute
leaders of older groups has led to those in place – including older groups -- becoming
bolder in their operations. In Nairobi, Kirinyaga, Murang’a and Kisii counties, respondents
revealed that ‘vigilantes’ comprise criminals yet work ‘in partnership’ with the police to
‘fight crime’. In Mombasa, the Republican Council has challenged the declaration that it is
an illegal group.29 Apparently, some members of the society tend to tolerate these groups
because they fill a gap in the provision of security. This tolerance is gradually contributing
to a culture that encourages unemployed youth to aspire to illicit behaviour. A growing
number of unemployed youth tends to look at these activities as a source of income. Failure
to act on these groups and to address youth unemployment therefore will lead to their
becoming rooted at the local level in a manner that would make it difficult to reverse their
growth.

65.

The national survey reveals that whereas Mungiki is the most known illegal group, with
members in 25 counties, there is a large concentration of old and new illegal groups in
Nairobi, Kisii, Kilifi and Mombasa counties. The groups emerge out of a need to address
security concerns in a neighbourhood. However, in poor areas of Nairobi, such as in Kibera,
they have been used to protect illegal tenants in houses whose owners were displaced
during the post-election violence. The groups are so organised that in some poor areas of
Nairobi, the police find it difficult to conduct operations: ‘A police man cannot just walk
into these places alone; they come in a group. And even then, the group of police officers
needs protection from the residents.’30

28

Interview with a senior government official, 29 Oct 2010; also ‘Security Chiefs Plot War against Gangs under New Law’, Daily
Nation, 6 Oct 2010
29 Interviews in Mombasa with members of the group, 15-18 Dec 2010; also ‘Mombasa Republican Council to Sue the State’, The
Star, 3 Jan 2010
30 Interview with a Community Policing member in Kibera, 29 Dec 2010
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66.

The following are the most common groups mentioned in the 47 counties:
Table 8: Illegal groups31
If yes, name the most common groups

Name

County where respondents knew members

Mungiki

Kirinyaga, Murang’a, Nyandarua, Nyeri, Kiambu, Kilifi, Tana River, Embu, Machakos,
Isiolo, Tharaka, Nairobi, Mandera, Homa Bay, Kisumu, Migori, Kisii, Kajiado, Narok,
Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Laikipia, Busia, Bungoma

Sungu Sungu

Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale, Homa Bay, Migori, Kisii, Nyamira, Trans Nzoia, Turkana

Taliban

Mombasa, Nairobi, Homa Bay, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru

Pamba 40

Kisii, Nairobi

Flying Squad

Kisii, Nairobi

Sabaot Land Defence Force

Trans Nzoia, Vihiga, Bungoma

Kamjesh

Nairobi

Jambazi

Nyamira, Bungoma

Somali Vigilante

Nairobi, Turkana

40 Brothers

Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale, Vihiga

Community Policing

Mombasa, Kisumu, Siaya, Nyamira

Congo by Force

Mombasa

Omaris

Nairobi

Baghdad Boys

Kilifi, Garissa, Mandera, Nairobi

The Al-Shabaab Militia

Kilifi, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera

67.

Focus groups and interviews in Kibera identified other groups such as 12 Disciples, 14
Flamingoes, Yes We Can, Siafu, Gendarmes, Bunker, Tuffgong, Gogo Boys, Labour,
Kamukunji Pressure Group, Force 10 and Olympic Youth. Others include The Rebels, Base
10, Al Aqsa, Rutanga, and Bunchers.

68.

A similar trend has been observed in other informal settlements in the east of Nairobi. The
new groups are said to form as a result of internal disagreements in existing groups,
particularly over sharing money or other spoils of crime.

69.

People have little confidence in these groups. Compared to 2008 immediately after the
violence, there are many people who now prefer protection by the police than by these
groups. It was also observed that although these groups demand protection fees, the people
pay because the police also ask for money to buy fuel for their vehicles or mobile phone
airtime to call their superiors. Some even argue that illegal groups while not acceptable to
society, have some advantages over the police. For example, they mete out ‘instant justice’
and are available at all times. They also ‘arrange’ for access to water, services, and negotiate
for employment or other opportunities.

31

See names of other groups in May 2009 and March 2010 review reports
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Table 9: Police versus local armed groups: Which is closest to your own view?

Which of the following is closest to your own view?
It is more important for local armed groups to protect their communities than
the police
It is more important for the police to protect communities than local armed
groups
It is more important for both the police and local armed groups to protect
communities
DK

70.

5%
74%
20%
1%

Asked what should be done to shut down the operations of these groups, 58 per cent of
Kenyans said that banning them and arresting their members would suffice. A worrying 10
per cent of the respondents supported extra-judicial executions, suggesting the
despondency the public feel have with regard to illegal groups as a threat to society.
Figure 14: What should be done to these groups so that they cease operating?

71.

Illegal groups thrive because of impunity, political support and structural factors such as
poverty and unemployment. Efforts to eradicate them must, therefore, focus on these
structural factors through implementation of Agenda 4 reforms, including ending the
culture of impunity. Special operations and ‘crackdowns’ have not been effective in dealing
with illegal groups. An assessment of Mt Elgon area by the Kenya Red Cross society in
November 2010 found that remnants of the Sabaot Land Defence Force, ostensibly crushed
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through a joint police-military operation (Operation Okoa Maisha) in March 2008 have
began to reorganise and to terrorise citizens.32
Conclusion
72. The ICC investigation of the Kenya situation has reached a critical point. However, some
political leaders have a common interest in thwarting the work of the ICC Chief Prosecutor
because indictment would negatively impact on political careers. They are collectively
contributing to the formation of ethno-regional alliances that would shield them from the
ICC process as well as promote their political interests. Some leaders in these new alliances
have an interest in opposing accountability, particularly if measures to do so undermine
their quest for national political power. These new dynamics imply that the ICC is likely to
face difficulties in obtaining full and effective cooperation from the political parties in the
coalition. Self interest rather than national good tends to be the driving force in attempts to
thwart the ICC process.
73.

Kenyans are supportive of the ICC and want to see senior people prosecuted and held
accountable for their role in the post-election violence. They want change. Politicians are
nonetheless unified in their efforts to oppose measures that run contrary to their quest to
consolidate power. They want the status quo to remain, and to sustain the old order. These
efforts show a major fault line between the aspirations of ordinary Kenyans and some
political leaders. There is need for the Government to support the people’s desires in order
to begin creating a new beginning.

74.

During this review period, there has been no known report of politicians activating any
illegal group for political purposes, such as organising violence. However, as the ICC
investigations get under way, and political strategies begin to be laid in preparation for the
2012 General Election, it is highly likely that such overtures could re-emerge. As noted
above, a culture that admires wealth from illicit activities will encourage more candidates
from the ranks of criminal organisations and gangs to seek political office. The likelihood of
using resources acquired from criminal activities to support violent campaign strategies is
not remote; it presents a real threat to peace and stability during the election year.

32
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3.

RESETTLEMENT OF IDPS AND RECONCILIATION AMONG COMMUNITIES

Introduction
75.
The KNDR agreement required the two parties to address the humanitarian crisis and
promote healing and reconciliation. The two parties were required to resettle Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and address the problems that IDPs faced. The previous review
reports have tracked progress in resettlement efforts and the challenges therein. The
findings generally suggested that the Government’s Operation Rudi Nyumbani enabled
many IDPs to return to their farms and to reconstruct their lives and livelihoods.
76.

This review again examines progress and challenges experienced in resettlement and
reconciliation among communities. It is noted here that allegations of corruption in the
resettlement programme, lack of social cohesion in return areas, landlessness and hate
speech over Mau Forest evictions and politicisation of the IDP problem generally combined
to create unsafe conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs.

Resettlement of IDPs
77. The presence of IDPs in ‘transit camps’ continues to attract political attention and to raise
concern among the public. Many are concerned that the Government disbursed funds for
resettlement, reconstruction of houses and purchase of land, yet the IDP problems are still
far from over.33 In the past three years, the Government reported spending Ksh7.977
billion to support IDPs.34
Table 10: Government disbursement in support of IDPs
Financial
Year

2007/2008

2008/2009

2009/2010

2010/2011

Amount
(Ksh)

1.25 billion

1.035 billion

3.005 billion

2.687 billion

78. In spite of this support and interventions to assist the IDPs, the number of displaced persons
in transit camps does not seem to have been reduced. This limited impact is attributable to
several factors. These include corruption in the resettlement programme involving especially
some Government officials and some IDP leaders. Some people were arrested and charged in
court but the cases are yet to be concluded.35
79. Secondly, the IDPs problem has been politicised by leaders from the areas where people
were displaced, as well as those who share an ethnic identity with the IDPs. IDPs have
become a source of political capital for some politicians. The May 2010 review report showed
that some politicians were making promises of land and scholarships to some IDPs to
influence them against giving incriminating evidence in investigations into the post-election
Interview with an official from the Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 31 Jan 2010, who said plans were under way to
construct houses for those in Ya Mumbi camp and then close it
34‘Statement on Government Support for IDPs’, Press statement from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of
Finance, The Star, 7 January, 2011
35 Interview with an official at the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP), 31 Jan 2011; also ‘State Admits to Presence of
Fraudsters in IDP Camps’, The Standard, 25 Jan 2010; ‘Imposters, Corrupt Officials Cash in on Displaced Persons’ Plight’, The
Standard, 26 Jan 2010
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violence. Other leaders have raised funds publicly on behalf of displaced persons, claiming
that the Government had neglected them.
80. Politicisation of the IDPs problem continues to recur regularly. Some politicians are
mobilising their ethnic communities to prevent the resettlement of IDPs in what they
consider their ancestral territory. They reject IDPs using the argument that the latter should
be returned to their ancestral districts since there are landless people among ‘indigenous’
communities who would like to be settled, too. Ethnicisation of resettlement efforts implies
continued problems for IDPs. These sentiments and ethnic claims to land are slowly
deepening the IDPs crisis. The IDPs problem is increasingly instrumentalised to assist in
political competition.
81. These factors have undermined the potential impact of the IDP resettlement programme.
But there are a number of initiatives under way that are likely to improve on this and offer a
sustainable solution. Important among these is the Bill of Rights in the New Constitution. If
effectively enforced, it could guarantee protection of lives and property for people in any part
of the country.
82. Second is the draft National Policy on Internal Displacement. The Protection Working
Group on Internal Displacement, comprising officials from the Government, human rights
and humanitarian organisations, is aligning the policy with the New Constitution to facilitate
its adoption and implementation.36 The Ministry of Special Programmes said it hoped to
finalise resettlement by the end of December 2011.
83. Finally, there is a ‘Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs’. 37 The
committee will look into how the Government has addressed the plight of current IDPs in
terms of basic food rations, shelter and compensation. It will also review existing institutions
and organs for addressing forced displacements, examine policies and laws governing all
forms of forced displacement with the aim of promoting protection and improving the wellbeing of forced migrants. The committee, whose mandate ends in May 2011, will make
recommendations on how to effectively address the IDP problem. .
84. These policy initiatives do not, however, reflect the complex dynamics of the IDPs crisis. A
complex land problem, entrenched ethnic mistrust and failed peace-building efforts have
made it difficult for IDPs to return in a sustainable manner. These are the challenges to be
tackled to enable IDPs to find durable solutions. These challenges are also anchored on the
broader democratic governance agenda and, therefore, interlinked with reforms in the
broader socio-political context. Thus only by undertaking reforms to stabilize the national
political context will the IDP problem be fully settled.
85. In the meantime, it is now well recognised that part of the solution to the IDPs problem is to
resettle some of them elsewhere. Over a quarter of respondents in successive surveys say
that resettling IDPs elsewhere is one important step the Government can take to address the
problem. A significant number also underline the need to resettle IDPs where they were
displaced from and give them land. While these are important strategies for addressing the
IDPs problem, they must be anchored on broader democratic governance reforms for better
36
37
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‘Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs’ The Hansard, 3 Nov 2010
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impact.
Table 11: Best ways to resolve the IDPs crisis
What is the most important thing the Government can do to address the problem of IDPs in Kenya?
Aug-09

Feb-10

Nov-10

Resettle them elsewhere

33%

34%

28%

Resettle them in areas where they were displaced from

25%

18%

24%

Give them financial assistance

12%

13%

28%

Promote peace and reconciliation

12%

12%

10%

Take them back to their ancestral districts

7%

12%

6%

Increase security

6%

9%

6%

Give them land

35%

Resettle them where they are

11%

DK

3%

1%

Other

2%

1%

1%

Shelter Reconstruction
86. The Government, development partners and humanitarian organisations have put
significant efforts into reconciling communities through peace meetings, training
workshops, counselling, sports and games, agriculture and livelihoods recovery programmes
as well as shelter reconstruction. Over 20,000 houses have been constructed by the
Government and humanitarian agencies with support from the African Development Bank
(ADB), the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN CERF) and development
partners. Other agencies that have supported IDPs shelter reconstruction include Habitat for
Humanity, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Goal Ireland, Kenya Red Cross
Society, Danish Refugee Council and the Catholic Church. Many others have supported
livelihoods recovery programmes such as provision of seed, fertilisers and other farm inputs.
87. IOM has been involved in the reconstruction programme since 2008. The organisation has
constructed over 11,000 houses for IDPs in various parts of Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, and
Molo, among others. Table 12 tracks the progress IOM reconstruction efforts have yielded in
the area.
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Table 12: IOM shelter reconstruction programme
Area
operation

of

2008
Funding
source

Molo District
lugari District
Wareng
District
Eldoret East
district
Eldoret West
district

UN Central
Emergency
Response
Fund

2009
Totals

Funding
source

2010
Totals

Funding
source

2011
Totals

Funding
Source

Totals

Totals
constructed

210

0

0

0

210

200

1540

0

0

1740

50

1457

1790

1784

5081

1396

2594

0

659

240
(UN CERF)

GOVT
of
JAPAN

480

ADB/MoSSP

478

African
Development
Bank (ADB)
and
MOSSP
(ADB/MoSSP)

0

659

0

T.East District

0

2131

0

0

2131

T.west District
GRAND
TOTALS

0

2206

0

0

2206

8473

2268

3180

14621

700

Source: IOM Eldoret Sub-Office, March 2011

88. Despite efforts to support shelter reconstruction, some IDPs have not been able to occupy
their reconstructed homes. For instance, in Kamuyu and Lorien, some IDPs have not
occupied their newly constructed houses. Some of those interviewed cite ethnic tension and
sporadic attacks. However, insecurity or fear is not the only problem. Some respondents
suggested that IDPs have houses elsewhere. There are also claims that some IDPs only
wanted to be allocated land because they were landless. Yet others claim not to have
furniture and other personal goods. This kind of reasoning betrays the dependency
syndrome that has characterised the lives of many IDPs, who have got used to receiving
handouts. It is this category of the displaced that many accuse of refusing to reconstruct
their lives because they ‘benefit’ from claiming to be IDPs. Nonetheless, the IDP problem is
continuing to become a complex issue that requires both administrative and policy
solutions; it should be attended to urgently.
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Reconciliation among Communities
89. Respondents in areas where IDPs have settled note that their relationship is good and they
are relating with IDPs well. Indeed, attacks against IDPs are few and isolated. Asked how
people related to the IDPs who lived in their areas (if any), 84 per cent said they related with
the respondents very well. Only a small proportion (5%) said they related badly, while 4 per
cent said they had a strained relationship. These observations point to improving relations at
the local level.
Figure 15: If there are IDPs in your area, how would you describe the relationship between IDPs
and the people of this area?
If yes, how would you describe the relationship between IDPs
and people of this area?
4%

Don't know

7%

very bad/bad

4%

Strained

84%
Very
good/good

90. Reconciliation among Kenyan communities is taking place, though gradually. There are
many people who feel that reconciliation is taking place but the responses do not suggest
that a lot has been achieved in this respect. In December 2010, only about 23 per cent said
that a lot of reconciliation had taken place. This is a drop from 33 per cent of the responses
obtained in the March 2009 survey.
Figure 16: How much would you say communities have reconciled?
Thinking about reconciliation among Kenyan communities after the
post-election violence, how much would you say communities have
reconciled?
3%
2%
3%

Don't know

Nov-10
7%

Not at all

22%

6%

Nov-09

59%

Just a little

66%

58%
18%

A lot

0%

34

10%

20%

23%
33%
30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Mar-09

91. Across the country, Rift Valley has slightly more people (24 per cent) who feel that a lot of
reconciliation has taken place. Few people feel that reconciliation has not taken place at all.
Table 13: How much would you say communities have reconciled? (by region)
CENTRAL

COAST

NAIROBI

NYANZA

RIFT VALLEY

WESTERN

A lot

25%

13%

13%

23%

24%

20%

Just a little

58%

67%

77%

69%

68%

72%

Not at all

11%

13%

8%

6%

5%

5%

DK

4%

7%

2%

2%

2%

1%

RTA

1%

0%

0%

0%

1%

1%

92. Most Kenyans have a strong sense of citizenship and express a high level of national
cohesion. Over 80 per cent have no problems relating with members of other communities,
and they would readily work and invest in regions settled by people from other tribes.
However, respondents expressed hesitation about the likelihood of building a house, buying
land or settling in an area dominated by members of another tribe.
Table 14: How likely or unlikely are you to co-exist with other tribes
How likely / unlikely are you able to do the following in an area where members of another community
live? (Those who said ‘very/somewhat likely’)
Buy land

70%

Set up a business

78%

Settle there

70%

Send your children to school

81%

Get employment

84%

Build a house

64%

93. Many people recognise that ethnicity and political utterances are a major challenge to peace
and reconciliation efforts in the country. Matters such as access to land, which are
sometimes cited as the cause of conflicts between communities, are not identified as major
challenges. This implies that democratic governance reforms are central to consolidating
peace and reconciliation efforts. Promoting reconciliation and unity in Kenya cannot,
therefore, be divorced from the fight against all forms of impunity and measures to entrench
political accountability, as well as delivering on all necessary reforms.
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Table 15: What is the most important challenge to peace and reconciliation efforts in your area?

What is the most important challenge to peace and reconciliation in your area?
Tribalism

27%

Political utterances

25%

Mistrust between ethnic groups

16%

Land disputes

9%

People who committed crimes are still free

8%

Lack of involvement by community members

6%

No response

6%

People are too hurt and traumatised

2%

Poverty

1%

Conclusions
94. The Government has provided resources to address the problems that IDPs face. It has
assisted some IDPs to buy land, and disbursed funds for start-up and reconstruction of
homes. In spite of these efforts, the problems facing the IDPs are far from over because they
are anchored on the broader socio-political context. Although resettlement is an important
intervention, sustainable solutions cannot be divorced from broader democratic governance
reforms.
95. The IDPs problem is increasingly politicised. IDPs have been used to advance the political
objectives of some leaders. Some politicians have opposed the resettlement of IDPs on land
perceived to be the preserve of their ethnic communities. This has not only ethnicised the
IDPs problem, but also created new dilemmas in the search for durable solutions. However,
provisions in the New Constitution, if enforced, present new opportunities for the protection
of the lives and property of IDPs in any county in Kenya.
96. Different leaders have conflicting political interests on the IDPs question. This undermines
the search for a durable solution. Those from the areas where the Government intends to
settle IDPs are opposed to resettlement because their own constituents demand that that
their landlessness problems be addressed. Those from the same ethnic community as the
IDPs are also keen to see the unconditional resettlement of the displaced.
97. The IDPs problem appears to be the result of failure to deepen democratic governance. Only
by correcting the practice of politics and use of political power for national good will this
problem be resolved in a sustainable manner.
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4.

THE ICC AND COHESION IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

Introduction
98. The KNDR agreement recognised that the post-election crisis revolved around issues of
power and the functioning of state institutions.38 The two parties agreed to share power and
to establish a Coalition Government to allow for undertaking of fundamental reforms. The
Constitution was amended to provide for the coalition in this respect.
99. Power sharing under the National Accord was not an end in itself but a means for achieving
reforms that would prevent future violence. It was ‘not about creating positions that reward
individuals’39. It was about ‘enabling leaders to look beyond partisan considerations with a
view to promoting the greater interests of the nation as whole’. The Agreement on the
Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government noted that the two parties were
setting the country forward on a new path. They committed themselves ‘to work together as
true partners, through constant consultations and willingness to compromise’. The
agreement required the new Government to pass and implement fundamental reforms,
including concluding a review of the constitution, to prevent future violence.
100. This section of the report examines coherence within the Coalition Government, how critical
reforms have been undertaken and the manner in which these reforms compromise unity
within the coalition. The issue of how the ICC process is affecting cohesion within the
Government is also addressed.
Key Findings
Summary of findings
• Power sharing conflicts continue to inform relations between the parties
• Most Kenyans think power sharing has benefitted the country
• Public satisfied with the working relationship between the President and
Prime Minister
• Political interests and lack of Government cohesion slow down the
implementation of the constitution
• Political Parties Disputes Tribunal formed to arbitrate inter- and intraparty wrangles
The Kenya Grand Coalition Government: Hiccups from the Start
101. Political parties get into power sharing arrangements when it is realised that no individual
party can govern without the other. But for power sharing to work, political elites have to
accommodate each other’s views, transcend ethnic and party differences, and compromise to
create a unity of purpose. These initiatives are critical for the purpose of implementing
policies and enhancing the stability of the country. Failure to compromise and transcend
parochial differences usually weakens not only the coalitions, but also threatens the stability
of the society. To promote cohesion, political elites in power are usually required to commit
themselves to the spirit of dialogue and consultations, as well as the pursuit of the national
Agenda Item 3: How to resolve the political crisis, from the annotated agenda prepared by Kenya National Dialogue and
Reconciliation team
39Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, available at www.dialoguekenya.org.
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interest.
102. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which established the Coalition Government,
clearly underlined the importance of these principles. The National Accord established a
framework that sought to promote the interests of the nation rather than narrow political
ones. Its goal was to achieve sustainable peace, stability and justice through the rule of law
and respect for human rights.
103. Kenya’s Coalition Government has had little cohesion from inception. Political factionalism
and divisions within the main parties have posed the greatest hurdles to consolidation of a
unity of purpose. Divisions along ethno-political lines continue to weaken the Government.
Personal political and ethnic interests have increasingly undermined unity. Indeed, rarely
does national or public interest override these narrow interests. In the recent past, and since
the ICC process entered high gear, the partner parties in the Coalition Government have had
difficulties forging a common position on how to undertake essential reforms.
104. But it is not the ICC process alone that is undermining unity in Government. The failure to
recognise that the Grand Coalition was not an end in itself but a means to undertaking farreaching reforms has seen the Government mired in endless conflicts. Additionally, the
failure to adhere to the principles outlined in the National Accord has deepened these
conflicts. Several factors stand out in this context. One is rewarding individuals rather than
looking beyond partisan considerations so as to promote national interests. This underlies
the nature of conflicts within the coalition because there aren’t enough resources to satisfy
everyone. Furthermore, each party would prefer to have more to reward its followers.
Second is the absence of a framework to resolve disputes. Thirdly, and finally, is the low level
of trust among political elites. The need to promote self interest contributes to mistrust and
suspicion. These factors have generally combined to intensify internal incoherence within
Government.
105. Most of the challenges facing the coalition have their origins in how individual elites in the
Government perceived power sharing. The parties went into power sharing arrangements as
different entities with varied agendas. While initial disputes centred on the meaning of ‘real
power sharing’ and how this would be operationalised, the instrumentalisation of power
sharing has perpetuated these early divisions. Political elites interpreted power sharing from
a point that gave them advantage rather than from a national interest point of view. Thus,
from the start, the Coalition Government faced challenges of cohesion.
106. The first divisions occurred over the composition of the Cabinet and how to share power.
The two principals nonetheless transcended their party divisions and formed a new Cabinet
based on the principal of 50-50 portfolio balance. Formation of the coalition Cabinet did not
end the initial differences and suspicions. Disputes emerged over which partner would
control which ministry. ODM was getting into power sharing when PNU had already
appointed Cabinet ministers before the mediation process had officially began. This certainly
constrained the consultations over which party would get what ministries. PNU allegedly did
not want to share power beyond cabinet positions, while ODM wanted senior public sector
positions included.
107.

The next conflict was on protocol and government hierarchy. Again, self-serving interests
informed interpretations on the hierarchy of power. Some argued that the Vice President
was second in hierarchy and that the Head of Civil Service had duties similar to those of the
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Prime Minister. This saw multiple interpretations of the duties of the two offices, according
to party lines, thus increasing suspicions and mistrust.
108. The import of these challenges is that they created within the public psyche an image of ‘twogovernments-in-one.’ In the surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009, the public generally
viewed the Government as comprising two factions, with one of having more power than the
other. In 2008, 49 per cent of respondents said power was not shared equally between PNU
and ODM. This increased to 58 per cent in August 2009.40 Lack of consensus over key
decisions and having different and opposed positions on major issues gave credence to this
view.
109. These conflicts keep recurring. The problem of power sharing has remained constant. In
addition, the two parties have not formed an effective conflict resolution mechanism that
could guide how to resolve the main sticking points. A coalition agreement that had been
drafted in 2008 after the signing of the National Accord was not signed. The closest the
parties have come to establishing such a mechanism is the setting up of the Permanent
Committee on the Management of the Affairs of the Coalition, which was stillborn and
ineffective, rarely meets and is yet to be effectively used.
110. These difficulties have impacted on people’s confidence in the Coalition Government. Asked
whether power sharing is anything they would like to see after another election, 75 per cent
of respondents answered in the negative, while 21 per cent said they would not mind it.
Figure 17: Is power sharing between parties in government something you would like to see after another
election?

Is power sharing between political parties in
government something you would like to see after
another election?

111. When asked about what they perceived as the main failures of the Coalition Government, 41
per cent of respondents cited the failure to fight corruption while another 38 per cent said it
was lack of political cohesion or unity within the coalition. It is significant that people pay
40

See South Consulting reports, January 2009; at www.dialoguekenya.org
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attention to key governance issues rather than development ones, in judging the success of
the Government. This is an important point to bear in mind – that governance is critical to
how people perceive the Government. In fact, the legitimacy of the Government is based not
only on the extent to which it delivers development, but also the extent to which it
undertakes democratic governance reforms. Thus, the fight against corruption, tribalism,
and political disunity appear as the main factors that people are unhappy about.
Figure 18: What are the main failures of the Coalition Government?

What would you say are the main failures of the Coalition
Government?
NR
Failure to deliver social services
Failure to fight poverty
Failure to create employment

2%
1%
2%
4%
26%

Failure to resettle IDPs

38%

Political disunity
Tribalism
Insecurity
Poor infrastructure
Lack of fighting corruption

22%
22%
23%
41%

112. Yet, Kenyans are not necessarily dismissive of the current power sharing arrangement. There
are many people who see the current power sharing arrangement as beneficial because it
pulled the country out of a crisis that threatened the future of Kenya. When asked how
power sharing has helped the country, 47 per cent said the enactment of a New Constitution
is the greatest benefit of the power sharing government. Another 45 per cent said it has
brought peace and stability, while 27 per cent cited improved ethnic relations.
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Table 16: In what ways, if any, has power sharing benefitted the country?

In what ways, if any, has power-sharing benefitted the
country? (multiple responses)
Brought new constitution

47%

Brought peace and stability

45%

Improved ethnic relations

27%

Improved economic development

16%

Helped in fighting corruption

15%

Nothing

12%

Others

3%

113. Many people are also satisfied with the Coalition Government in respect of promoting media
freedom, implementing the Constitution, and promoting reconciliation among communities.
They are dissatisfied about how the Government has addressed youth unemployment and
how it is resettling the IDPs. These are the main issues that constituted the agreement on
Agenda 4 of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Agreement. They
require urgent attention.
Figure 19: Thinking about the Coalition Government, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with its
performance in the following areas?

Thinking about the Coalition Government, how satisfied
or dissatisfied are you with its performance in the
following areas…
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114. Close to half of the population in the counties most affected by violence acknowledge that
the Government has restored peace: 66 per cent of respondents in Trans Nzoia, 44 per cent
in Uasin Gishu, 43 per cent in Nakuru, and 46 per cent in Nandi counties, which were all
affected by the PEV, say the Government has restored peace and stability. Table 18 provides
an overview of responses in these counties. The new constitution and peace and stability are
identified generally as the main achievements.
Table 17: In what ways, if any, has power sharing benefitted the country? (Selected counties)
Kisumu

Kisii

Kiambu

Kericho

Nandi

Trans
Nzoia

Turkana

Uasin
Gishu

Nakur
u

Momb
asa

Improved ethnic
relations

26%

21%

18%

18%

19%

31%

36%

30%

36%

20%

Brought new
constitution

58%

62%

54%

37%

50%

24%

68%

45%

47%

39%

Brought peace
and stability

57%

34%

41%

39%

46%

62%

47%

44%

43%

40%

Helped in fighting
corruption

11%

29%

27%

15%

8%

13%

22%

10%

29%

18%

Improved
economic
development

23%

13%

14%

19%

15%

21%

9%

19%

21%

16%

Others

8%

8%

3%

2%

0%

1%

0%

3%

2%

6%

Nothing

7%

10%

5%

22%

14%

15%

2%

14%

6%

18%

115. To many Kenyans, power sharing is still relevant three years after the signing of the National
Accord. As many as 74 per cent of the respondents noted that the power sharing agreement
between PNU and ODM is still relevant since the coalition is expected to implement the new
laws. Further to some respondents, the coalition ‘is the only government we have now to
ensure future stability by implementing the New Constitution.’41
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Interview with a teacher from Kiambu County, 29 January 2011
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Figure 20: How relevant is power sharing between PNU and ODM today?

How relevant is power-sharing between PNU and ODM
today?

116. As many as 86% of Kenyans would prefer the Coalition Government to remain in office until
2012. They want the coalition to facilitate the implementation of the New Constitution by
remaining in office instead of conducting new elections.
Figure 21: Do you prefer that the Coalition Government continues until 2012, or do you prefer that the
country holds a General Election before 2012?

Do you prefer that the coalition government continues
until 2012, or do you prefer that the country holds
general elections before 2012?
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117. Although people would like the coalition to remain in power to implement reforms, the
manner in which these reforms are implemented is impacting on unity within the
Government and especially between the two parties. It is also weakening the main parties.
Over half of the population generally feel that the Government is having a hard time working
in unison to implement the Constitution. This was a 7% increase from December 2010 and
reflects the escalated divisions within the coalition.
Figure 22: In your opinion, does the Coalition Government have an easy or hard time
working together in the Constitution implementation process? (March 2011)
In your opinion, is it easy or hard for the grand coalition government working
together? (March 2011)
60%

58%

50%
40%

36%

30%

Easy
Hard

20%
Don't Know / Not sure
No response

10%
5%
1%

0%
Easy
Hard
Don't Know /
Not sure

No response

118. People are clear that disunity within the coalition is preventing key reforms. It is making it
hard for the Government to implement the New Constitution.
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Figure 23: What is the most important reason why it is hard for the Coalition Government to
work together? (March 2011)

119. Lack of cohesion within the Government and political party divisions continue to entrench
the public perception of divisions within it. Even on matters relating to major reforms, the
image of ‘two-governments-in-one,’ is reinforced because there are always likely to be ‘two
different voices’ or even ‘two versions of the story’ on each issue. This is attested by how the
two partners in government continue to react to the ICC process, tackling corruption, and
even to the appointments under the New Constitution.
120. From December 2010 when the ICC Chief Prosecutor identified six people for prosecution,
the two partners in Government have issued contradictory and opposing views on the
position of the Government. While those in PNU and their new allies in ODM argued for
deferral of the Kenyan case and even lobbied the African Union and United Nations Security
Council to assist in attaining this goal, ODM refused to support the initiative, arguing that
the Cabinet did not resolve to do so and dismissed the effort as a partisan and personal
agenda. The government has also challenged the admissibility of the six ICC cases but ODM
said it is not party to these efforts. This has continued to portray the government as ‘twogovernments-in-one’.
121. The ICC prosecutions have further split ODM with the party MPs sharply divided on what
support to offer their colleagues who were named by the ICC. This has witnessed the party
leaders and members giving contradictory statements on the party position. These disputes
and politicization of the ICC process has led to slow implementation of the new constitution
with energies being diverted to strategising and formation of political alliances on the ICC
process. The ethnic mobilisation taking place in these rallies is similar to what accompanied
the companies for the 2007 elections and the violence thereafter.
122. Making appointments under the New Constitution have polarised the government even
further because the framework on which the two parties can agree on these appointments is
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fairly weak. Specifically, on 28 January 2011, the President announced names of nominees to
the offices of the Attorney General, Chief Justice, Director of Public Prosecutions and
Director of Budget, saying he had consulted with the Prime Minister. However, the Prime
Minister argued that full consultations and consensus had not taken place and, therefore,
the nominees had not been agreed upon.
123. While the President later rescinded the appointments and asked the JSC and Public Service
Commission to assist in filling the positions, political debate over the appointments had
already deeply polarised the elite along party and ethnic lines. It also led to discussions on
relevance of the Coalition Government with some politicians calling for the dissolution of
parliament and holding of elections. Polarisation resulting from these disputes has rapidly
shifted the focus of the debate away from reforms to consolidation of political power and
even of ethnic interests.
124. The issue of ‘real power sharing’ and how it should be implemented continues to antagonise
relations between the two parties in a manner that affects how reforms are carried out.42 The
old debate about the powers of both the President and the Prime Minister under the
National Accord has resurfaced in the implementation of key reforms. Some of those in PNU
still argue that the two Principals are not legally equal and that the President has the final
word on key decisions.43 In addition, they argue that the requirement for consultations does
not imply consensus, something they say is difficult to achieve. However, ODM argues that
the spirit of the National Accord, as well as the transitional clauses in the Constitution state
that the Prime Minister and President should consult and agree on key decisions.44 They
argue that the spirit of the New Constitution is far more critical and ought to be respected.
125. These conflicts have once again brought to the fore the need to form active conflict
mediation organs within the coalition to facilitate consultations and consensus building. The
coalition partners will, most of the time, have differences on matters of policy and tactics.
That is why the National Accord set out the principles of partnership in the coalition and
identified consultations and willingness to compromise as important for the stability of the
Government. The constitution further provided for consultations between the two principals
on major decisions to promote national harmony and avoid unnecessary friction.
126. Parliament reacted to the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s action of naming six people as suspects by
introducing and debating a motion seeking to make Kenya pull out of the Rome Statute. Yet,
the Government ratified the treaty in 2005 and domesticated it in December 2008 by
enacting the International Crimes Act 2008. The parliamentary debate was stormy. Political
passions that had been evident in the aftermath of the PEV returned, raising tensions in the
country. In the heat of the moment the language of ‘our people are targeted’ resurfaced and
obscured the notion that it was individual accountability being sought over the post-election
violence and not communities. These sentiments will continue to ethnicise the reform
agenda, even though the New Constitution seeks to move people away from ethnic to civic
based politics.
127. MPs passed the motion urging the Government to withdraw from the ICC treaty. Political
interests related to the 2012 elections, inter- and intra-party divisions and alliances –
sometimes along ethnic lines – contributed to the manner in which MPs voted. The main

Interview with an ODM MP, January 2011
Interview with PNU MP, January 2011
44 ODM MP, Ibid
42
43
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motivation behind these political alliances is purely political self-preservation.45 Some
politicians want to remain relevant by using the ICC process to appear as “martyrs” and
making Kenyans believe that they have been sacrificed to protect some leaders. In addition,
the alliances are being used as a buffer from the ICC process by raising emotions and threat
of violence if the trials take place. The alliances are not based on any idea or ideology. It is a
marriage of convenience.46
128. These alliances and divisions have made it difficult to systematically implement reforms yet
the window of opportunity to pass critical bills is fast closing. There are at least 25 bills that
need to be passed to prepare the ground for the 2012 general elections. Of urgency is the
need to establish the Independent Boundaries and Electoral Review Commission and pass
new election laws. It is also important to note that the 2012 elections will be held under an
entirely new structure of devolved government. Country governments, Assemblies and the
Senate are all provided for in the new constitution, but the specific acts of parliament
outlining their establishment and functions are not yet in place. With this kind of work
ahead, a politically charged atmosphere poisoned by ethnic tension is the last thing Kenya
needs.
129. Party factionalism points to lack of institutionalisation despite the enactment of the Political
Parties Act. Passed in 2007, and coming into effect a year later, the law provides a
framework for the registration, regulation and funding of political parties. However, its
enforcement has been weak. It is hoped that the recently formed Political Parties Dispute
Tribunal will assist the parties to solve disputes expeditiously and amicably before they spill
over into the coalition.
130. The political parties need to also re-engineer themselves using the New Constitution.
Chapter 6 on leadership and integrity should guide parties on how to elect office bearers and
leaders in general. Enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 6 will help in instituting a
mature political culture.47 The values and principles contained in the Constitution must be
embedded in a new political culture; a new way of doing things, which unities all Kenyans
around a strong national identity.
Conclusion
131. The Coalition Government was established for the purpose of implementing reforms. The
passage of the New Constitution brings new opportunities -- it lays the basis for establishing
a strong foundation for governance and leadership. However, implementing the New
Constitution continues to face key challenges due to lack of cohesion within the coalition
parties and the Government.
132.

The ICC process has brought new challenges. Some actors, who have a common interest in
perpetuating impunity, have re-grouped to stall the ICC process as well as oppose any
demands for criminal and political accountability. But the ICC is important in one respect: it
is proving that the most powerful and influential people can also be held to account. Indeed,
this is the first time that powerful people are being called to account. The success of the
process will undoubtedly assist in creating a new culture promised under the New
Constitution.
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Interview with a policy analyst, 25 March 2011
Interview with a civil society key informant, 23 March 2011
47 Remarks by a Cabinet minister during the Kenya National Dialogue Conference: Two Years on, Where are We? Held on 2-3
December 2010
46

47

133. The Coalition Government is still divided over many issues. These divisions will deepen as
the country moves close to the campaigns for 2012 elections. Urgently needed are coalition
management structures to encourage cohesion and bipartisan support for the
implementation of the New Constitution. Mechanisms to resolve disputes especially between
the two principals should be carefully designed and effected to ensure that the disputes do
not derail the New Constitution. National interests should supersede individual political
interests.
134. The two parties have to recognise that a New Constitution is an opportunity to do things
differently. It does not give them an opportunity to entrench a culture of patronage.
Appointments to new institutions, therefore, should be made on the basis of the values and
principles of the New Constitution. Ethnic, political and party considerations that have in
the past informed composition of public sector institutions should be done away with.
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5.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Introduction
135. Agenda Item 4 of KNDR identified what was considered the long term issues and solutions.
Addressing the ‘underlying causes of violence’ would prevent recurrence in future and lead
to a better, more secure and prosperous nation. Under the framework of Agenda 4, the
Coalition Government was to undertake a broad range of reforms, including constitutional,
legal and institutional reforms.
136. This section of the report examines progress in implementing the Constitution because it
lays a firm foundation for other reforms
Key Findings
Summary of findings
Constitutional, legal and institutional reforms
• Government appoints members to key institutions for the implementation of
the Constitution
• Political interests and inadequate civic education threaten to derail the
implementation process
• President appoints members of the Judicial Service Commission
• Police Reforms Implementation Committee drafts Bills to facilitate reforms
• Ministry of Lands drafts the National Land Commission Bill, 2010
• Government appoints a National Task Force on Devolved Governments
• Government establishes institutions to promote national cohesion and unity
• Some progress made in the fight against corruption
Constitution Implementation Process
137. A New Constitution was promulgated on 27 August 2010 following an affirmative
referendum vote on 4 August. It enjoys high legitimacy, having been passed by close to 70
per cent of the voters. Its framework comprises tight schedules on implementation. There is
a five-year implementation timeframe, during which relevant institutions will be established
and legislation passed.
138. The New Constitution espouses important national values and principles of governance.
New institutions and practices are supposed to operate within a context of new values and
principles of governance. Integrity, transparency, democracy and people’s participation are
some of the values underpinning the new style of governance.
139. The New Constitution has restructured institutions of governance and established
mechanisms for holding state officers accountable. It has also identified the obligations and
responsibilities of citizens. On the whole, the New Constitution seeks to create a new
political culture by introducing new values in how the state and its institutions relate to the
society, as well as how citizens attend to the state.
140. The time frame for implementing the New Constitution requires that the various organs of
Government move with speed to set up new institutions and pass the required laws. It
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provides for the establishment of three key institutions to spearhead the implementation of
the New Constitution: the Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC), the
Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), and the Commission on
Revenue Allocation (CRA). The Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee was
established on 9 October 2010. The chairpersons and members to the CIC and the CRA were
appointed on 30 December 2010. These appointments were behind schedule by over a
month. And because of the delay in establishing them, the drafting of relevant laws and
establishing of other institutions is also behind schedule. The main challenges responsible
for this are examined below.
141. The CIC has the mandate to monitor, facilitate and oversee the implementation of the
constitution. In fulfilling the above the CIC has, since its establishment, developed a draft
work plan and held consultative and thematic based meetings to spearhead the
constitutional implementation process. It has also reviewed and handed over to the Attorney
General, five Bills amongst them the Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission
(IEBC) Bill, the Independent Offices Bill and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission
Bill. Further, the CIC has made an application to the Court of Appeal seeking interpretation
of contentious provisions in the constitution.48 These measures are intended to lay the
foundation for the comprehensive and timely implementation of the constitution within the
stipulated five year time frame.
142. The sixth schedule of the constitution espouses the various legislation that need to be
enacted for the comprehensive implementation of the constitution. To date, two pieces of
legislation have been enacted under the new constitution. These are the Judicial Service Act
and the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act which are intended to foster reforms within
the judicial system.49 By this April, parliament was debating several other bills including the
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Review Commission Bill, Salaries and
Remunerations Bill, Supreme Court Bill, and the Independent Commissions Bill.
143. These are important steps in the implementation process. But the process is behind schedule
and it may difficult to pass the required number by 27 August 2011 which Article 261 (1) of
the constitution has set as the date for enacting 16 pieces of legislation (one year after the
constitution came into effect). It is therefore necessary that parliament moves with speed to
enact the relevant laws to oversee the process.
Challenges to the Implementation Process
144. The March 2011 survey asked people the difficulties that they would associate with the
implementation of the New Constitution. 27 per cent identified lack of cohesion within the
coalition government as one of the main challenges most likely to undermine
implementation. Also, 25 per cent of respondents identified political interests as a difficulty
while 10 per cent said lack of political will could undermine the implementation process.
Corruption and contentious issues within the constitution were also cited as come on the
impediments to the process. The ICC process, in combination with the above mentioned
factors are already impeding the implementation process.

48 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution. Quarterly Report, January- March 2011. See also The Star, Monday,
March 7, 2011.Pg 22
49 http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr
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145. It is worth emphasising that vested political interests are responsible for the delays in
establishing the institutions and constituting new bodies as required by the New
Constitution. The process of implementing the New Constitution is largely dependent on the
legislature to pass Bills and policies to smooth the process along. However, Parliament’s
ability to enact these laws is threatened by vested interests within and outside the
legislature. For instance, MPs declined to approve the names of the nominees to the CIC and
CRA owing to disagreements over the delimitation of new constituencies as proposed by the
Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC).
146. Some MPs and commissioners within IIBRC questioned the validity of the commission’s
proposals on the new constituencies, thereby initiating a dispute over whether IIBRC was
objective in its work. This dispute spilled to Parliament, where MPs threatened not to
approve the names proposed for the CIC and CRA. Such were the political interests that
delayed establishing these bodies. Ultimately, it was only after a political deal on how the
IIBRC’s report would be managed by a successor commission that nominees to the two
constitution implementation commissions were approved.
147. The CIC and the CRA are not the only bodies that have suffered the consequence of vested
interests. The appointment of state officers for other bodies such as the Chief Justice, the
Attorney General, Director of Public Prosecutions and the Controller of Budget has provoked
a dispute between the two parties in the coalition, culminating in revocation of the
appointments. The dispute centred on whether there were consultations between the two
Principals before the President forwarded nominations to parliament for vetting. The
ensuing acrimonious debate over these appointments demonstrated that political interests
have begun to challenge implementation of the Constitution. There are actors who would
like to implement the Constitution in a manner that suits their political interests rather than
the public good. It is these narrow political interests that are determining the pace and
nature of implementation.
148. Implementation is also challenged by the presence of a critical group of influential people in
both the bureaucracy and in Parliament who were not passionate about the New
Constitution at the time of the referendum. They have a common interest in maintaining the
status quo or implementing the New Constitution in a manner that does not threaten their
interests. It is this group of non-passionate individuals that prefers a ‘business-as-usual’
approach.
149. Inadequate civic awareness around the Constitution is also affecting public participation in
the implementation process. Despite their overwhelming support for the Constitution, many
Kenyans are still relatively unaware of its provisions. The lack of structured debate on the
content of the new laws means that the public is not sufficiently involved in the debates on
the implementation process.
150. Inadequate civic education explains the low number of people who say they know much
about the New Constitution. In the survey, only 12 per cent of Kenyans said they knew a lot
about the New Constitution. Up to 70 per cent of respondents said they knew just some of it,
while 11 per cent said they knew nothing. The main source of what the 12 per cent know
about the Constitution came from the media. Of those who know a lot about the
Constitution, 81 per cent obtained the information from the media, while another 52 per
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cent said they read the constitution. Political parties and civil society groups, except religious
organisations, appear not to be effectively involved in civic education.
Figure 24: If you know a lot, what are the sources of what you know?

(If a lot or just some of it):What are your sources of
what you know about the constitution (multiple
responses)

151. People are also not actively involved in debates about implementation. A middling 53 per
cent of those interviewed said they were not involved in the discussions on constitutional
implementation process. Only 11 per cent are very involved, meaning that they are aware
about what is happening.
152. Lack of awareness or involvement in discussions on implementation can lead to poor
oversight. It can also reduce or stifle the demand side of reforms. Increased civic awareness
is, therefore, critical for building strong oversight bodies and increasing the capacity to
demand reforms. The CIC and civil society organisations need to embark on an elaborate
civic education programme to increase awareness of the provisions and guarantees in the
New Constitution.
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Figure 25: How actively are you involved in public discussions about implementation of the new
constitution?

153. Up to 90 per cent of Kenyans say that the New Constitution is satisfactory in addressing
their needs. In terms of the priorities for the Government, about 26 per cent want the New
Constitution used to address the problem of security, 22 per cent want the Government to
deliver jobs or employment, and 16 per cent want the Government to address corruption.
These responses are captured in the Figure 26.
Figure 26: In the new constitutional implementation process, what do you want to see the Government
prioritise?

In the constitutional implementation process, what do
you want to see the government prioritise?
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Other institutional reforms
The Judiciary
154. The New Constitution has anchored judicial reforms: The review and promulgation of the
New Constitution has enabled the commencement of legislative and administrative
measures to introduce reforms within the judicial system. Chapter Ten of the Constitution
lays the foundation for judicial reforms and independence by providing for the
establishment of a Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and a Judiciary Fund. It also
establishes a Supreme Court, mandated to, among other things, adjudicate over presidential
election disputes. The Constitution also recognises traditional courts as alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. These measures are intended to promote a transparent, accountable
and independent judicial service.
155. Judicial Service Commission (JSC) Appointed: A Judicial Service Commission mandated to
oversee administrative, managerial and operational reform within the judiciary was
established on 30 December 2010.50 As provided in the Constitution, the establishment of
the JSC involved public and legislative participation in the appointment of members. Public
participation in the management and administration of the judiciary has been enhanced by
the inclusion of public representatives in the commission.
156. Legislative and policy frameworks for judicial reforms enacted: The Judicial Service Act,
2011, and the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act, 2011, have been enacted. The Judicial
Service Act will promote efficiency and effectiveness in judicial service delivery and provide
a basis for merit-based recruitment, appointment, discipline and removal of judicial
officers.51 The Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act provides a legal framework through
which serving and prospective judicial officers are vetted for their suitability to serve in the
judiciary.52
157. In order to improve the quality of service delivery, the judiciary is in the process of
incorporating Information and Communication Technology (ICT) measures in the
administration of justice. During this review period, it launched the Judiciary ICT Policy &
Strategic Plan 2011-2013, which is intended to provide automated systems for the recording,
preservation and retrieval of information, case and document management, SMS query
service for information on the judiciary, and conducting virtual court sessions across the
country.53
158. The main challenge in undertaking comprehensive judicial reforms has been Executive
dominance of the Judiciary. The lack of independence witnessed increased use of political
considerations in appointments to key positions in the judiciary. This has tended to weaken
delivery of services. It is hoped that the Judicial Service Commission and the ethos of the
New Constitution will enhance service delivery, and particularly access to justice in the
country. But as already mentioned, vested interests both within Parliament and outside it
have begun to undermine the spirit to infuse new values in the governance of the society.
Nomination of the Chief Justice by the President has already raised considerable concern.
Kenya Gazette, Special Issue Vol, CXII-No. 136 Dated 31 December, 2010. Gazette Notice Number 16956
Judicial Service Act.
52 Vetting of Judge and Magistrate Act.
53 The Judiciary, Launch of the Judiciary ICT Policy & Strategic Plan 2011-2013. Daily Nation, 14 October 2010, p. 31
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These concerns should be addressed in a manner that lends credence and legitimacy to the
process of appointment. The process has already been politicised and the public is,
therefore, likely to see the new office bearers as representing certain political interests rather
than facilitating reforms.
Police Reforms
159. The New Constitution has prioritised police reforms. Previous reports have indicated public
dissatisfaction with the performance of the police owing to claims of corruption, brutality
and a culture of extra-judicial killings by some members of the force. In January 2010, the
Government appointed the Police Reforms Implementation Committee (PRIC) to oversee
the implementation of the recommendations made by the National Task Force on police
reforms.
160. The Committee has drafted a number of Bills on police reforms which have been presented
to stakeholders for discussion. These include the Independent Policing Oversight Authority
Bill, 2010, which is intended to provide a civilian oversight mechanism over policing in the
country; the National Police Service Bill, 2010, which places the Kenya Police Service and
the Administration Police under one command structure and specifies the roles of the two
security services; and the National Police Service Commission Bill -- meant to provide a legal
framework for the administration of the National Police Service.54
161. The New Constitution has emphasised the need for new values in future policing. The KNDR
agreement itself underlined the need for comprehensive police reforms before the next
General Election. No major reform has been undertaken in the force since then. However,
the framework to guide such reforms is in place.
162. Attitudinal change and political commitment are required for comprehensive police reforms.
Although people’s confidence in police has been rising from 2008, still not many are
satisfied with the work of the police. Up to 57 per cent of Kenyans are dissatisfied with the
performance of the police, but 42 per cent are happy with their work. Although the
committee has laid out the framework for reforms, there is need to emphasise the urgency of
implementation before the next General Election.

54 Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, 2010, the National Police Service Bill, 2010, the National Police Service
Commission Bill, 2010.
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Figure 27: Thinking about the performance of the police after the passage of the constitution, would you
say the police have done an excellent, good, poor or very poor job in protecting the rights of Kenyans?

Conclusions
163. The New Constitution has renewed optimism for a new culture of governance. Many
Kenyans believe their lives will be better under the New Constitution. There are new values
and principles of governance to direct relations between the Government and the people.
These new values have created an environment for a new beginning.
164. The main challenge to the implementation of the New Constitution is the vested political
interests and divisions within the Coalition Government. Appointments are made on basis of
ethno-political considerations and narrow interests. There is also limited public debate on
policy implications of the New Constitution. Political disputes arising over appointments to
new positions have deflected attention from how reforms could be carried out.
165. A New Constitution means a new beginning. It is not business as usual. It also requires a
high sense of commitment to the new values and principles guiding the conduct of
Government and relations with the people. There is need to break from the old ways of doing
things and give the new values a chance to guide the future of Kenya. Continuous education
of the public on the various provisions of the Constitution is required to generate adequate
demand for reform.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
166. This report has focused on several themes drawing from the KNDR agreement (the National
Accord) as well as the New Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The review has again emphasised
that the reforms undertaken both under the National Accord and the New Constitution of
Kenya are critical for securing sustainable peace and democratic governance. The National
Accord established the Coalition Government not as an end in itself, but a means to securing
peace, security and justice. The coalition was formed not for the purpose of helping any
individual but to promote the greater good of the nation. This value continues to guide the
review of progress in the implementation of crucial reforms.
167. This concluding section reiterates some of the outstanding findings and conclusions. It also
discusses some recommendations to facilitate reforms, especially now that the Constitution
has laid out a framework for fundamental changes in the practice of governance and politics.
The Findings
168. Data from the survey and field interviews reveal that the security situation in the country has
improved and life is better than it was in 2008 and 2009. The number of people who feel the
situation is worse has decreased from 70 per cent in 2008 to 17 per cent in December 2010.
There are also more people who feel safer today than in 2008. Only 28 per cent said they felt
safer in 2008 compared to 72 per cent who expressed this feeling in 2010.
169. These findings show that political violence has not recurred since the time of signing the
Accord. The situation has normalised and calm obtains. Whether this situation is sustainable
depends on how politicians organise campaigns for the next General Election and,
specifically, whether or not their differences will not result to conflicts among them. This
observation is made in recognition that national level political conflicts rapidly and violently
trickle down to the local level. Secondly, the underlying factors that contributed to the post2007 election crisis have not been systematically addressed. A New Constitution is only a
beginning. Management of national level political differences and conflicts should be
prioritised as the country prepares for the campaigns season ahead of the next General
Election.
170. The ICC process has begun in earnest after the Chief Prosecutor identified six people whose
prosecution he will seek to pursue. This has heightened anxiety, which has in turn created
political realignments for the purpose of securing the interests and political careers of senior
politicians. But Kenyans are happy with the investigations. This is the first time influential
and powerful people are being held to account. Kenyans are generally supportive of the ICC
process and are confident that prosecutions will take place because prosecution is the only
remaining option to hold people accountable. To many of them, senior and influential
people have a common interest in perpetuating impunity and opposing measures for
accountability. The ICC process, therefore, provides an opportunity to fight impunity.
171. The IDPs problem is yet to be fully addressed. Some IDPs are still in transit camps in spite of
the efforts of the Government and humanitarian agencies in providing funds for
resettlement. The IDPs problem is yet to be resolved because they have become a major
political resource for politicians. The IDPs question is increasingly used to advance political
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interests of individual leaders. They use the IDPs to advance their own interests. Thus the
IDP problem has become so politicised that its solution cannot be divorced from the broad
democratic governance reforms. The practice of inclusive politics and responsible leadership
will help to obviate some of the causes of displacement.
172. Cohesion within the coalition remains elusive; the Government is still divided over many
issues. The ICC process has brought with it new challenges. The parties are divided on how
to approach the problem of impunity. Internal factionalism within the political parties has
added to this complexity. The parties appear fragmented along many lines, including ethnoregional and personality fault lines. This factionalism is increasingly affecting
implementation of the New Constitution. However, people view the Coalition Government as
still relevant especially for the purpose of pushing the reform agenda forward. They want the
Coalition to remain until 2012.
Conclusion
173. The New Constitution has renewed optimism for a new culture of governance. It carries the
hope of resolving issues identified under Agenda Item 4 and specifically issues that
contributed to the post-election violence. Many Kenyans believe their lives will be better
under the New Constitution. But there are new challenges facing its implementation. Among
these are the deeply vested interests and an old political culture. Short-term and narrow
interests rather than the national ones appear to inform the process of implementation.
Short-term foci, combined with lack of cohesion within the Government, and lack of
leadership to manage political differences, mean that the country risks failing again.
174. The majority of voters supported the New Constitution. They gave it legitimacy by approving
it in large numbers. They aspired for a new Kenya and a new beginning. They voted for new
values and new principles of governance. They chose to have ethical leadership and
responsible leaders. Failing to live by the spirit and the values embraced by the New
Constitution will disillusion the public, with certain negative consequences.
175. Although the ICC process has introduced certain challenges, it is also an important
opportunity for reforms. The process is laying the framework for fighting impunity and
ensuring that leaders account for their actions. The ICC process is not aimed at communities
but at fighting impunity and getting justice for the victims of the post-election violence.
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